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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nutrition in Pakistan - Key Challenges: Rates of undernutrition have remained unchanged in
Pakistan for over half a century. Nutrition has received little attention in Pakistan and has
been dealt with through a project-based bureaucratic approach with few incentives for state
officials to go beyond their prescribed functions. Moreover, undernutrition has not yet become
a political or electoral issue, the legislature’s involvement is missing, and it has garnered no
executive interest from the top political offices of the country.
Both the state and international donors have only recently started to pay attention to
nutrition, with much of the impetus for action coming from donors, in the wake of national
emergencies and related research. As such, nutrition is currently in a state of transition in
Pakistan. Horizontal coordination is improving and funds are available to develop various
interventions. Vertical integration, capacity, and monitoring are still issues that need to be
dealt with, but a conversation around these issues is developing. New integrated strategies
are currently under development at the national and provincial levels. There is also an
increasing chance that the systems being put in place now will start to deliver over the
next few years.
In this report, we use political economy analysis to demonstrate that nutrition in Pakistan has
remained off the policy agenda because of large disconnects between key sectors, a lack of
integrated cross-sectoral programmes, and a missing constituency for nutrition within the
political and bureaucratic elites, civil society groups, and the electorate in general.
This study moves beyond a discussion of health-specific interventions and recommendations
to focus instead on governance-related explanations and interventions that focus on the roles
that policy, actors, and institutions play. This approach leads the study to conclude that
undernutrition in Pakistan remains high because of a lack of cross-sectoral collaboration
between the different institutions that deal with this issue, a lack of a strong national agenda
against undernutrition that emanates from within the highest executive offices of the state,
and a lack of consistent monitoring of the situation using reliable data.
National-level analysis overview: Prior to 2011, Pakistan lacked a national nutrition
policy, with the 2002 National Nutrition Strategic Plan never having been implemented.
The 2011 Pakistan Integrated Nutrition Strategy (PINS), however, sets out an incremental
plan for the implementation of a host of nutrition-related interventions, and is now in its
preliminary stages of adoption. Each of the four provinces and three regions of Pakistan have
begun drafting inter-sectoral nutrition strategies. The implementation in 2011 of a National
Nutrition Survey (NNS) underscored the increased interest in the issue. The survey revealed
both high and stagnant rates of undernutrition, spurring attention from the media and
furthering political attention to the issue.
Although undernutrition is by definition a multi-sectoral issue, implementation to date
has not been coordinated across ministries and departments, and responsibilities have
often not been clearly delineated. The 2010 18th Amendment that devolved 17 ministries
from the centre to the provinces, including the ministries of health, education, food and
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agriculture, women development, and social welfare and special education, created a new
fiscal distribution system and a fully restructured system for social service delivery. Postdevolution, a Nutrition Wing was established in the Planning Commission (PC), which may
once again create issues since PC is not an implementing agency, and there is still no nutrition
policy to regularise the issue within the regular working of ministries. Nutrition is still dealt
with through the development budget of the PC rather than as an integrated part of the
recurrent budget of the Ministry of Finance. Coordination between departments, and between
government and non-state actors, is further complicated by the diversity of perspectives and
goals with which they work. Donors view good nutrition as a means to achieving growth,
the PC frames nutrition as a social outcome of economic growth, and the legislature is
focused on food security.
The capacity of provincial departmental staff to deliver at scale is limited both in terms of the
number of staff available within provincial departments to deal with nutrition, as well as in
terms of the staff’s understanding of undernutrition. There are two particular areas of
concern related to vertical integration that are highlighted. Firstly, as one respondent put
it, “the administrative structure is still trying to catch up with devolution,” which is most
evident in provincial governments’ ability to plan, design, and implement large nutrition
programmes, and even if staff positions were to be increased, “expertise on nutrition is
at a premium in Pakistan”. Secondly, the network of sub-provincial staff available to
implement interventions is weak, and the Pakistani bureaucracy’s limited capacity to deliver
social services predates devolution (Easterly 2003, ICG 2010). In addition, there is no
frontline staff focused on nutrition in particular, and frontline staff do not coordinate
horizontally.
When the Ministry of Health (MoH) established a Nutrition Wing in 2002 with the
responsibility for implementing and monitoring health-related nutrition activities, the wing
itself had no direct role or presence in the districts for the actual implementation of these
activities. This, according to many, is the crucial missing link in any effort to reduce rates of
undernutrition, because greater coordination at the federal and provincial levels will
effect little real change in the absence of effective delivery systems at the district level and
below.
Data collection efforts also suffer from low frequency, quality, and detail. Regular and
frequent data is required to both quantify and monitor the problem and motivate political
action, whilst disaggregation is necessary for planning and targeting. In Pakistan, adequate
funding for nutrition interventions is less of an issue compared to the other dimensions of
nutrition governance discussed above. Donors have committed large sums to nutrition,
increased provincial responsibilities have been accompanied by the largest National Finance
Commission (NFC awards ever, and provinces can raise further funds directly from donors.
However, whilst there is talk of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) and pooled funding,
and there is an effort to coordinate the support to nutrition interventions, donor funds are
still allocated separately and through different modalities. Furthermore, the preponderance
of donor funding has led to concerns regarding the extent of state ownership of the
growing number of nutrition initiatives, whilst the lack of ownership has further motivated
donors to fund specific programmes directly.
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Provincial-level analysis overview: Historically, provinces lacked cohesive planning for
nutrition and followed tailored initiatives shaped by development partners and the federally
supported Lady Health Worker (LHW) Programme. In the post devolution context, provinces
have increased fiscal and strategic space to act on nutrition as well as varying potential in
terms of contextual resources, governance, funding, and interest.
Punjab has surplus food production, lower poverty levels, and better access to water,
sanitation, and preventive health; however, Southern Punjab districts have inequitable land
distribution, greater poverty, and less access to social services, so they are the main source of
undernutrition and demand district-focused strategies. Punjab has a supportive executive
bureaucracy, strong administrative control over implementation, and has integrated nutrition
within health, hence enhancing sustainability in one sector. However, construct of nutrition
remains a health activity requiring multi-sectoral linkages rather than a wider cross-sectoral
agenda.
In Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK), low outreach access in certain districts, social exclusion of
women, and conflict are the largest contextual issues, but it is not food-insecure — based on a
more equitable distribution of land and greater crop diversification — and has lower levels of
undernutrition than Sindh and Balochistan. KPK has reorganised the Health Department
around nutrition-related issues, sustainability and reforms are high on the provincial
development agenda, and nutrition is following a slow but deliberative process, being
carefully tied to the provinces’ post-devolution development vision.
Sindh is less well-positioned. Despite being the second-most food-producing province, Sindh
faces considerable undernutrition and the highest level of food insecurity, which are due to
contextual issues of inequitable land ownership, poverty, patriarchy, and poor delivery of
social-sector services. Weak cross-sectoral coalition, low district accountability, and weak
governance in Sindh is likely to undermine both horizontal coordination and implementation
of nutrition. Sindh also has the most promising non-state sector, but there is lack of
cooperation by the state.
Balochistan is most susceptible to external context, facing high food insecurity, chronic water
shortage, vulnerability to both drought and flooding, inadequate outreach of social-sector
services, and a patriarchal and tribal power structure. This is reflected in its very high level
of undernutrition. It also is constrained by weak political leadership for championing and low
district accountability for implementation. However, Balochistan is better-positioned than
Sindh due to stronger coalition building amongst key sectors and cohesive working led by
Planning and Development Department (P&DD).
Given these differences, one strategy may not fit all, and attention needs to be given to
sub-national variations.
Opportunities and Moving Ahead: In the post-devolution context, nutrition crosssectoral dialogue has started in each of the provinces, led by the P&DD and technically
supported by development partners. Planning in Health has already begun with movement
towards cost-effective interventions. Whilst momentum has been built for nutrition, it
has to be sharpened and sustained. A bidirectional approach will be needed, aimed at
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securing both political and programmatic commitment. Political championing at the highest
level is needed to establish nutrition as a development agenda across sectors. This necessitates
a bipartisan adoption across party lines to avoid the danger of marginalisation of nutrition if it
remains tied to a single party’s agenda. For this to happen, the case for nutrition needs to be
well-presented to politicians and the executive bureaucracy through well-targeted advocacy.
Policy dialogues can be strategically supported by refining roles between national and
provincial governments. Whilst nutrition will have a strong provincial strategic home, there
need to be links with federal overarching budgetary frameworks and with federally retained
structures such as the Ministry of Food Security and BISP. Adoption of a nutrition lens is
needed in sectoral planning across key sectors, such as poverty, food, agriculture, health,
education, and disaster management. This would require identification and adoption of
nutrition indicators in relevant sectors and a cross-sectoral nutrition framework to ensure
sustainability.
Operationally, a structural home for nutrition is needed in each of the provinces to mainstream
nutrition as a subject across different sectors. Planning through such central convening agents
should encourage joint initiatives across sectors using well-defined interventions, common
beneficiaries, and cooperation initiatives such as SAP, such joint nutrition initiatives can be
implemented through separate sectoral budgetary lines but must be accompanied by strong
coordination and joint monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks to monitor interim
progress on nutrition. Funding has a role for placement of strategic incentives for nutrition.
Donor funding may be used to increase state allocations, whilst both state and donor funding
modalities must be carefully chosen to catalyse an evidence-based culture at both planning
and local implementation levels, and movement of nutrition from development to operational
budgets.
In moving ahead, strategic coordination forums are needed with the non-state sector.
Advocacy coalitions with Community Support Organisations (CSOs), experts, and media
must be set up and segmentally target policymakers, implementers, and community.
Nutrition also requires investment in community mobilisation networks at sub-district
and local levels for absorption of nutrition outreach activities.
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INTRODUCTION
Undernutrition is a recognised health problem in Pakistan and plays a substantial role in the
country’s elevated maternal and child morbidity/mortality. This is evident from the fact that
the percentages of underweight, stunted, and wasted children (under the age of five years) in
Pakistan are reported as 31.5 per cent, 43.7 per cent, and 15.1 per cent respectively (NNS,
2011). This varies to some extent across its different provinces, but everywhere, levels of
undernutrition are well above acceptable standards, including the World Health Organization
(WHO) threshold of 15 per cent for Global Acute Malnutrition, beyond which the situation is
considered an emergency. Yet, there has been little action on improving nutrition in Pakistan.
In fact, rates of undernutrition have remained unchanged in Pakistan for over half a century
(Figure 1). Both the state and international donors have only recently started to pay attention
to the issue, and, so far, much of the impetus for action has come from the latter group
of actors.

It is essential to understand the causal pathways of undernutrition in order to identify
resources or lack of resources for addressing undernutrition (Figure 2). Nutrition is linked
to the availability of household food security, healthy environment, health status and caregiver
resources. Poverty and disasters constrain access to these resources and overarching
institutional, political, and economic structures facilitate or constrain access to these resources,
as well. Given that undernutrition is a multi-dimensional issue, its reduction requires efforts
across a number of sectors, such as: provision of adequate food, disease prevention, promotion
of hygienic behavioural practises, access to clean water, exclusive breastfeeding of children
under six months of age and timely complementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation,
and supplementary feeding. Therefore, nutrition lies across a number of ministries — health,
education, agriculture, food, women’s welfare, and water and sanitation. Furthermore,
nutrition levels are also determined by “how society is organised in regard to economic
structure, political and ideological expectations, and the institutions through which activities

8

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERNUTRITION NATIONAL REPORT: PAKISTAN

within society are regulated, social values are met, and potential resources are converted into
actual resources” (Mejia Acosta & Fanzo 2012). Nutrition is usually confused with both
health or food security, and programmes and actions are very often limited to these areas.
This has been a central part of the challenge of reducing undernutrition rates around the
world, including in Pakistan, since the other related sectors, as well as underlying social and
political structures, are ignored by efforts to bring about sustainable change and impact.
Figure 2: Causal Pathway of Undernutrition

Source: UNICEF 1990, Benson & Shekar 2006.

In the first and second section of this report, we apply political economy analysis to
understand why nutrition has received such little attention to date in Pakistan. The political
history of the country and the power relationships between its various institutions form a
central part of our analysis. We pay particular attention to disaggregating the state, and to
understanding the incentives of its various actors and institutions, and the tensions that exist
between their differing roles. An analysis of the relationship between politicians and the
bureaucracy, between different state institutions at the federal level, between the centre and
the provinces, and between the state and donor organisations is central to understanding the
lack of movement on nutrition in the country. Our main line of analysis concludes that
nutrition in Pakistan has remained off the policy agenda because of large disconnects between
key sectors, a lack of integrated cross-sectoral programmes, and a missing constituency for
nutrition within the political and bureaucratic elites, within civil society groups, and within
the electorate in general. Rather than requiring more financial resources, we find that in
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Pakistan, undernutrition reduction is far more an issue of the lack of prioritisation, coordination,
integrated frameworks, and transparency.
The aim of this analysis is to understand the constraints and opportunities that exist at the
agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle. In other words, if the aim is to put nutrition on the
agenda of the government, what are the barriers and emerging opportunities of which we
should be aware? The objective here is to better understand factors that affect the commitment
of national actors and institutions to food- and nutrition-related policies. We, therefore, ask a
three-part question in this paper: (a) Why has nutrition not been on the agenda in Pakistan? (b)
How has it been dealt with so far? (c) What can be done to put it on the policy agenda? In
answering these questions, we focus on finding pathways along which the various actors and
institutions can move towards s greater policy attention to nutrition, and the bottlenecks that
exist in the adoption of nutrition policy.
In the third section of this report, we take a comparative look at strategic opportunities and
barriers for action on undernutrition in Pakistan’s four provinces — KPK, Punjab,
Baluchistan, and Sindh — in the post-devolution context. This is particularly important for
two reasons. First, provinces in Pakistan have important variations in terms of food security,
health, water and sanitation access, poverty levels, disaster threats, and power structures, all
of which together contribute to nutrition. Second, there have been important, recent, national
developments in Pakistan empowering provinces for a lead role for nutrition governance. In
April 2010, the parliament of Pakistan passed the 18th Amendment that devolved 17 ministries
from the centre to the provinces, including a number of ministries, such as health, education,
food, and agriculture. This was the first time that such power was given to the provinces,
since past decentralisation reforms had generally bypassed the provincial tier by decentralising
administrative responsibility for most social services directly to the sub-provincial district
level. At the same time, there were significant changes in funding modalities. Whilst the
2010 devolution shifted the financing responsibility for devolved ministries to provincial
governments, provincial funding allocations increased substantially as a result of the 7th
NFC award of 2010. The financial status of provincial governments in Pakistan is dependent
on federal transfers of tax revenues to the provinces constituted through the NFC awards. The
2010 NFC award historically increased provincial share of resources to 56 per cent and also
introduced a more equitable distribution formula benefiting the smaller provinces with a
shift from population basis of award to also factoring in backwardness, inverse population
density, and revenue collection/generation (Sabir 2011).

Conceptual Framework
The political economy analysis developed in this report draws heavily from a nutrition
governance framework (Figure 3) that focuses on the capacities of relevant stakeholders and
the broad parameters of the existing institutions and policy frameworks in which they operate,
and it focuses in particular on: (a) cooperation between different stakeholders in the design,
formulation, and implementation of nutrition policy; (b) extent of integration between
policy formulation and implementation at different levels of government; and (c) the
extent to which this cooperation and integration is held together by adequate funding and
monitoring mechanisms (Mejia Acosta & Fanzo 2012). In examining these three dimensions
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of nutrition governance — horizontal coordination, vertical integration, and funding and
monitoring — we draw also on a policy analysis framework that allows us to shift our
attention away from the content of reform to focus instead on the actors involved in each of
these three dimensions, the context within which they operate, and the processes that explain
why desired policy outcomes fail to emerge (Walt & Gilson 1994). The two frameworks
together allow us to better understand factors that affect the commitment of national actors
and institutions to nutrition-related policies.
Figure 3: The Nutrition Governance Framework

Intersectoral cooperation
Policy
frameworks

Technical
capacity

Stakeholders

Sustainable funding

Nutrition
outcomes

Vertical
coordination

Source: Acosta, M. & Fanzo, J. (2012). Fighting Maternal and Child Malnutrition: Analysing the political
and institutional determinants of delivering a national multi-sectoral response in six countries.
Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Our focus in this report is on both chronic and acute malnutrition, and our target groups are
defined as pregnant and lactating women, and children under the age of five. This includes the
period considered the “critical window of opportunity” — the first 1,000 days of a child’s life
from the nine months in utero to two years of age1 — because the periods of pregnancy and
lactation and the first two years of life are “when nutrition requirements are greatest and when
these population subgroups are most vulnerable to inadequate caring behaviours, inadequate
access to health services, and inappropriate feeding practises” (Mejia Acosta & Fanzo 2012).
The subgroup of children under the age of five corresponds to the internationally agreed-upon
age group for monitoring child undernutrition and mortality.

Methodology
This report is a political economy analysis of nutrition policy and the provincial experiences
with nutrition policy in Pakistan, looking at both chronic and acute malnutrition. The report is
not a technical analysis of undernutrition itself in Pakistan. The background and federal
analysis bases its findings and recommendations on (a) an engagement with the literature on
political economy analyses of undernutrition and some comparisons with other countries’
contexts; (b) a review of nutrition policy in Pakistan to date; (c) review of project and
programme material produced by international donors working on nutrition in Pakistan; (d)
an interaction with national-level stakeholders at an inception meeting organised by Aga Khan
University (AKU) in Islamabad in June 2012; and most importantly, (e) a one-week field
mission in Islamabad, in October 2012 during which a series of semi-structured interviews were
conducted with key respondents from the government, donor organisations, NGOs, and
research institutions.
See http://www.thousanddays.org/
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The provincial comparison analysis is based on 84 in-depth interviews and seven focal group
discussions carried out in July and August 2012 with stakeholders from the state, donor
agencies, civil society organisations, and nutrition experts. This was followed by consultative
provincial roundtables in October and November 2012 to validate and supplement findings
of the desk review and interviews (see Annex 1 for list of interviews carried out for the
political economy analyses). The data has been analysed through a systematisation of the
evidence generated through the interviews, and a triangulation of this evidence with the range
of written sources mentioned above. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the findings
of this report are based on an engagement with a limited number of key respondents and
resource materials, and that its conclusions should be generalised with care.

Outline of the Report
This report is divided into four distinct sections.
Section 1 - Social Development and the Context of Social Policy - sets out the issue of
lagging social development in Pakistan despite a good economic growth rate over the last 65
years, and the political and social context of social policy in the country. Specifically, this
part looks at:




The historical political context of social policy in Pakistan and the unique development
of its institutions;
The social context and its implications for social policy.
The history of decentralisation in Pakistan and the context created by the recent
devolution of power and administrative functions to the provinces in Pakistan.

Section 2 of the report - Nutrition Governance at the Federal Level - turns to look at the current
state of nutrition governance in Pakistan and within the section:





Provides an analysis of the various stakeholders of nutrition policy, focusing in
particular on their incentives and roles, and considers issues of horizontal coordination
between the various stakeholders;
Looks at issues of vertical integration and monitoring across different levels of
government;
Analyses the funding of nutrition interventions;

Section 3 of the report – Provincial Comparisons - takes a comparative look at strategic opportunities
and barriers for action on undernutrition in Pakistan’s four provinces (KPK, Punjab, Baluchistan,
and Sindh) in the post-devolution context. This includes:






Reviewing the nutrition situation in the four provinces;
Discussing contextual and resource constraints in the provinces;
Further delving into the issues with vertical integration and monitoring at the
provincial level;
Looking at horizontal coordination for nutrition, including stakeholders and leadership;
Analysing the funding of nutrition interventions at the provincial level.
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Finally, Section 4 – Key Recommendations – concludes the report by identifying opportunities
for the way forward; providing a few lessons from the experience with nutrition policy in
a few select countries and, drawing on these, identifying key entry points for policy
interventions in Pakistan.
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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE
CONTEXT OF SOCIAL POLICY
Pakistan’s nutrition puzzle is not unlike that of India. Many analyses have asked why, despite
a strong economic growth rate over a better part of the last 60 years, do rates of undernutrition
remain so high in India (Balarajan & Reich 2012; Mohmand 2012)? The same question
applies to Pakistan, and in this case, the contradiction results from its overall experience with
social policy. Easterly (2003) has described Pakistan’s development experience as the paradox
of growth without development, referring to the fact that the country’s successful growth
performance has not been able to translate into meaningful social development for a majority
of its citizens. Until the recent economic slowdown², Pakistan had been the fastest-growing
country in the region, with its growth rates more in line with East Asian than with South
Asian economies (Figure 4) (Mohmand & Cheema 2007).
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rates (1960-1994)

Despite this growth, the contrast between Pakistan’s growth success and its social development
performance could not be starker. Pakistan ranks 145th out of 187 countries on the 2012
Human Development Index (UNDP 2012). Its income level alone would place it at 138th, but
its performance on health issues drops it to 143rd whilst its performance on education brings it
down lower to 161st. It has consistently under-performed relative to comparative economies at
similar income levels across a range of social development indicators. For example, during
its first 50 years, Pakistan had 20 per cent fewer elementary-school-age children enrolled in
primary schools; 24 per cent more of its population was illiterate; 36 per cent fewer births
were attended by trained personnel; its under-five mortality rate was 19 per cent higher; and
23 per cent less of its population had access to sanitation relative to comparator countries
(Easterly 2003).
Quite obviously, much of the blame for the poor provision of social services has come to
rest on the bureaucracy, which has been portrayed as hierarchical, often inefficient
² Since 2008, GDP growth rate has reduced to just over three per cent per annum.
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and prone to corruption (Easterly 2001, ICG 2010). However, bureaucratic corruption is
rarely an explanation in itself, and much of the explanation for this pattern of lagging social
development lies in the political history of the country, and in the particular manner in which
its institutions have developed. In addition, it is compounded by specific social contextual
factors, including patriarchy, ethnic heterogeneity, and the recent violence and conflict. This
combination of factors has resulted in many social-sector issues either receiving limited
attention — such as the low proportion of GDP that is spent on education (2.7 per cent) and
health (0.8 per cent) (UNDP 2012) — or being ignored altogether, as in the case of nutrition.
Each of these explanations is discussed in the sections below.

1.1 Institutional Development and Social Policy
Most accounts of Pakistan’s political history point to the preponderance and dominance of
three groups — the landed “feudal” elites, the army, and the bureaucracy. These institutions
have been closely intertwined through the country’s 65-year history, and have together
ensured that, except for brief periods, the focus of politics has rarely come to rest on the
general populace or its social developmental needs. The account of this history of exclusion
starts before the partition of India and Pakistan, and its telling provides an explanation of
why a different set of institutions took control in each country.³
The colonial state and the landed elite of British India’s countryside had a special, mutually
reinforcing relationship which led to the two main political parties — the Congress in India
and the Muslim League in Pakistan — emerging from colonial rule with a high dependence
on “locally dominant rural elites” (Harriss 1989; Alavi 2002). However, whilst India’s
emerging urban, industrial capitalist class became an important part of the Congress party,
within which it funded politics and the nationalist movement that the party led for Indian
independence, the same class’s relative weakness in the Muslim-majority areas that came to
constitute East and West Pakistan at partition meant that it was unable to fund either the
Muslim League or the movement for Pakistan that it led (Alavi 1989).
The Muslim League, instead, came to be centred on the urban “salariat”,4 which later came to
dominate the civil bureaucracy in the new states, and “big landowners, especially of the
Punjab” (Alavi 1989). Though the rural landed elite were also a part of the Congress, they
were essentially “junior partners” (Alavi 1989). The difference in the importance of landed
groups within the two parties meant that whilst India instituted land reforms soon after
independence, these were avoided in Pakistan. India’s land reforms reduced the landed elite’s
centrality in post-independence politics and opened up the space for the emergence of new
political groups and leaders (Banerjee & Iyer 2004). In Pakistan, on the other hand, the
landed class’s centrality within the Muslim League helped them transition into becoming an
important component of the governing class of the new state, and so land reforms were
obviously not on the agenda.
3 The

following is an excerpt from Mohmand 2011.
uses for the salaried class of Muslim government servants, especially those in the
Hindu-majority parts of northern India that came to form the core of the Pakistan movement. Alavi
argues that having seen a diminution in its share of jobs in pre-partition India, the Muslim salariat
saw that it stood to gain most from the creation of a new state.
4 A term Alavi
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Pakistan’s initial years were difficult and unstable. The Muslim League did not have a
large support base in the provinces that now constituted Pakistan5, and the need to “enforce
central authority over provinces where the Muslim League’s organisational machinery was
virtually non-existent” had the party turn to the bureaucracy for support (Jalal 1994). Without
broad-based support, the Muslim League quickly lost out to the bureaucracy in terms of
authority and dominance within the state structure. The institution of the “One Unit” system
in 1954 furthered the centralisation of administrative authority. This process was facilitated
by the power struggle between West Pakistan, which dominated the army and bureaucracy,
and East Pakistan, which had a demographic majority. “In any representative political system,
the Bengalis [of East Pakistan] would dominate power at the centre” (Jalal 1994: 251). Civil
and military officers decided, therefore, to avoid elections altogether and the bureaucracyassisted military coup of 1958 decidedly shifted the balance of power in favour of the army
and the bureaucracy in Pakistan (Alavi 1989: 18; Sayeed 1980; Gardezi 1983).
Within this oligarchy, the rural landed elite played an important role each time military
dictatorships needed a parliamentary front for their authoritarian rule. In looking for suitable
politicians, these regimes concentrated on landed groups for an obvious reason — their ability
to pull in votes even without the support of a strong party structure. Therefore, whilst the
military kept Pakistan’s political system focused on priorities emanating from the logic of the
Cold War and from strategic security concerns vis-à-vis its neighbours — the ‘garrison,
national security state’ that undermined the development of representative political institutions
— politically influential landed groups have provided support and legitimacy for this system
(Ali 1970; Alavi 1972b; Jalal 1995; Diamond 2000; Haqqani 2005; Bhave & Kingston
2010). Furthermore, whilst India’s Second Five-Year Plan led to the development of a
modern industrial sector with a diversified base, the industrial sector lagged in its development
in Pakistan, which remained import-dependent. The industrial class remained weak, and
whilst the landed classes ruled the countryside, urban areas were dominated by an unusually
large “salariat” that drew its power from the state (Alavi 1989: 19).
The spaces created in India by the waning influence of landed groups were gradually filled
by political actors led by the logic of electoral majorities. A sustained space for such electoral
logic never opened up in Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan’s political parties have had little room for
manoeuvre under the “military-bureaucratic oligarchy”. Whilst the Muslim League lost out to
this alliance early on, later parties were undermined and manipulated — their activities
were restricted, their leaders repeatedly jailed or exiled, and new loyal-to-the-king parties
continually created and disbanded. For a brief period in the 1970s, it had seemed that the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was in the process of building a broad support base around
both the urban and rural poor that was not very different from the class- and ideology-based
political identification that Kaviraj (2000a) claims existed in India under Nehru. However,
this lasted only until the next military regime came along in 1977, and, since then, political
parties in Pakistan have been unable — through extended periods of manipulations and
restrictions, and limited periods in actual power — to build broad constituencies or develop
broad programmatic connections with voters.
5 The

Muslim League’s main support through the Pakistan movement had come from the Muslim populations of
Hindu-majority states. Its support from Muslim-majority states had come close to partition in 1947 and was based
not on ideology but on strategic alliances with locally powerful groups, such as the landlords of Punjab.
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In summary, Pakistan has been through repeated cycles of democratic transitions and reversals
over the last six decades. After independence in 1947, the new country struggled through seven
different nominated governments for 11 years whilst a constitution was written and a system of
governance devised. As soon as the constitution was ready and the country’s first election was
announced, General Ayub Khan took over in a military coup in 1958 and ruled for the next 11
years in a pattern that would become standard practise for Pakistan’s later military dictators —
controlled, party-less national and local elections, and the creation of puppet political parties.
Pakistan’s first election was finally held in 1970 after the fall of Ayub’s regime following a
popular movement. Out of this movement rose the PPP that swept the first election6 and ruled
Pakistan through its first democratic transition and its only full democratic term to date.
The next reversal came soon enough, when General Zia used the civil unrest brought on by an
urban movement against the alleged rigging of the second election in 1977 as an excuse for a
coup. After this, Pakistan went through two periods of authoritarian military rule under General
Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008), and an 11-year period of
democratic transition between these that was marked by the quickly changing civilian governments
of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Four elections were held in these intermediate 11 years —
bringing into power first Bhutto (1988), then Sharif (1990), then Bhutto (1993) and then Sharif
again (1997) — until General Musharraf’s coup heralded another reversal in 1999. This third
military regime came to an end in 2008, and the PPP came back to power for its fourth term since
the 1970 election, to preside over yet another democratic transition. However, once again, the
transition has been uncomfortable, with electronic news channels and newspapers having repeatedly
announced the imminent fall of the government. The fact that it has survived to call the next
election at the near end of a full term has surprised people more than if it were to have fallen
without completing its five-year term.
By most accounts, the balance of power in Pakistan continues to rest with non-elected institutions
of the state, the bureaucracy has rarely been accountable to the legislature, and political parties
are still weak with limited support bases. The lack of broad constituencies or programmatic
linkages with voters has meant that parties rely on a combination of three types of linkages to
bring in votes during elections; (a) the landed power of candidates and local leaders, (b) extended
links of kinship, and (c) clientelistic networks. These three together have created an electoral
logic that has so far worked against the need to develop strong social policies or to perform well
on its delivery to the general populace. Above all, what this account of Pakistan’s political history
illuminates is the fact that this is a state and a system that is undergoing yet another democratic
transition, and one that is still fragile and a while away from consolidation. An important constraint
that must inform our analysis in this report is that the logic of governments in transition, dealing
with the politics of survival, is different from the logic of those that operate within democratically
consolidated systems.

6 The election of 1970 was actually won by

the Awami League of East Pakistan. After it seceded to become Bangladesh

in 1971, the PPP, which had won in West Pakistan, formed government.
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1.2 Social Context
One reason given for Pakistan’s lagging performance on social policy is its history of
authoritarian rule under military governments. However, social policy need not always
suffer under military rule, South Korea’s experience being a case in point (Ringen et al.
2011). In Pakistan’s case, a number of other contextual factors compound the problem,
beyond the above-mentioned lack of accountability of the bureaucracy, primacy of landed
groups in politics, and survival politics employed in unstable systems. These contextual
factors include ethnic fragmentation, patriarchy, and violent conflict.
1.2.1 Social Heterogeneity and Polarisation (Ethnic Fragmentation)
Easterly (2003) found evidence for the hypothesis that Pakistan’s lagging social development,
as compared to other countries with the same level of income, is correlated with a high
degree of ethnic and class polarisation, and Pakistan does indeed have a highly fragmented
society. The political history recounted earlier has already alluded to two developments that
define the origins of class and ethnic polarisation in Pakistan.
First, the power to govern and make policy has remained throughout its history with the rural
landed elite and with the urban ‘salariat’, both of which form two distinct class groups.
When this division is added to the widespread practise of biraderi7-based endogamy, one
gets a social system that is deeply polarised and in which the power of these two groups in
particular has been reproduced within small social circles, without distinguishable linkages
to other classes and social groups. Though the boundaries of political and bureaucratic circles
are being pushed outwards to include members of other social groups, this is a recent
phenomenon and has not yet affected the elite nature of Pakistan’s policy circles.
Second, Pakistan was created out of an amalgamation of the Muslim-majority provinces of
India that had, until 1947, shared little else in common. The creation of a common, collective
identity has proved to be particularly difficult over the last 65 years. Pakistan remains home
to multiple ethnic and linguistic groups separated across regions, and often represented by
regional political parties. This was most starkly visible in the divide between East and West
Pakistan that grew from a conflict based on language, and which in turn led to the secession
of East Pakistan in 1971 to form Bangladesh. Separatist sentiment has also been expressed in
the other provinces, through Ghaffar Khan’s pre-partition Khudai Khitmatgar, or Red Shirts
movement, that continued in diluted form through Pakistan’s initial years in KPK, through
G.M. Syed’s Jeay Sindh movement in Sindh, and through the repeated resurgence of Baloch
nationalism in the form of a separatist movement in Baluchistan. The salience of the depth
of these ethno-linguistic divisions is obvious in the violence with which the state has
countered some of the movements, namely in East Pakistan and Baluchistan. Ethno-linguistic
differences have also contributed to the violence in Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi,
between Urdu-speaking “muhajirs” (partition migrants from various parts of India),
Pashto-speaking Pukhtun migrants to the city from KPK and parts of Baluchistan, and
the Sindhi-speaking natives of the province.
7 Lineage

groups (see more detailed explanation in next section).
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1.2.2 Patriarchy
A social structure that cuts across all provincial and district boundaries in Pakistan, and has
perhaps proved to be the most resilient of all, is patriarchy. The kinship group, defined as
Pakistan’s primary form of social organisation, is, in fact, maintained through the exercise of
male control over women and their marriage choices (Alavi 2001: 66). This derives from the
fact that the kinship system is based on patrilineal descent and, therefore, control over women
and marriage logically serves to perpetuate the kin group, whilst the submission of female
will to male decision-making serves to maintain the particular identity of the group. It is not
surprising, then, that in a country where social structures are defined as kinship groups that
base their identity on common male ancestry, patriarchal values are strong across the variation
of kin groups found from KPK to Sindh.
Patriarchy is maintained through a combination of social exclusions that result in women
experiencing more severe poverty as compared to men, a phenomenon referred to as the
feminisation of poverty. Mohmand and Gazdar (2006) found that whilst men recognise the
Islamic right of women to inherit a share of land, they insist that their culture dictated
otherwise. Therefore, an absolute minority of women actually own land, and, when they do, it
is managed by male members of the family.8 Resources are not transferred to women in any
other form, to the extent that even the Islamic practise of giving haq mehar to a bride is not
practised widely, and where it is practised, the amount is nominal and does not provide economic
security or independence to the woman. Women are also not involved in significant incomegenerating activities. In Mohmand and Gazdar’s (2006) study, only five per cent of women
had an income source of their own. Greater involvement was found only where men have
migrated, leaving the responsibility of land cultivation to women, or where women of lower
caste work as agricultural servants on the lands of others.
The lack of control over economic resources and an independent source of income forms the
lynchpin of the patriarchal kinship systems of Pakistan, and places decision-making power in
the hands of men. This dependence is also reflected in the political sphere, where women are
25 per cent less likely to vote than men and do not have any direct contact with political
representatives (Mohmand & Gazdar 2006). There are few female councillors, and where they
do exist, they are limited by the same rules of mobility as other women, and are often
represented on councils by their husbands (Mohmand 2012). The major impact of this is
that political candidates recognise that women form an inactive and unaware vote bank that
votes according to decisions taken by men. Therefore, they do not have to be responsive to
needs articulated by women despite the fact that an earlier study ascertained that men and
women demand very different things (Mohmand & Cheema 2004). Candidates understand
that in order to win a group’s vote, they have to cater to the needs and demands of its
male members. Essentially, the ability of women to use the political arena to change their
marginalised position is severely constrained by the same social structures that restrict their
control over economic resources.

8 These

findings are based on fieldwork conducted in seven districts of three provinces in Pakistan.
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The social exclusion of women extends beyond the economic and political arenas to include
exclusion from social services as well. Easterly (2003) pointed out that Pakistan’s education
lag is largely explained by a massive shortfall in female enrolment. Sen’s “missing women”
thesis (Sen 1992) explains that Pakistan’s demographic sex ratio of 106 men to 100 women
reveals that women’s access to health services is significantly limited compared to that of
men, and that their nutrition and health levels are much worse. These differentials also reveal
that services provided to a village are not equally accessible by all households and groups, but
that social structures work to socially exclude certain groups from access — in this case,
women. Patriarchy is, therefore, a social structure that causes the social exclusion of women
at various levels. It has resulted in women being poorer than men, having low literacy rates,
not being prioritised in terms of their health and nutrition needs, and not being able to make
their own decisions, which includes not being able to decide when they will get married and
how many children they will have.
1.2.3 Conflict and Violence
Added to the complicating factors above is the fact that Pakistan has experienced severe violence
in its recent past. Much of the ethnic fragmentation and social polarisation mentioned above has
erupted over the last decade into different forms of violence that has affected large sections of
the country. In Sindh, this is confined largely to Karachi, where ethnic and political rivalry
between its various ethno-linguistic groups, overlaid with religious, sectarian violence and gang
wars, have caused a high death toll through much of the 1990s. Since 2010, this has resumed
in severe form. In Baluchistan, violence is between Baloch nationalists seeking self-determination
and the government’s counter-movement. Both sides have resorted to violence that has exposed
its capital city of Quetta to regular incidents of kidnappings, targeted killings, and ‘disappearances’.
The violence in the rest of the country is more overtly religious in nature.
In South Punjab, rival Shia and Sunni groups frequently target each other’s members and
supporters, and Al-Qaeda-supported groups are allegedly on the rise. In the rest of the
country — principally in Islamabad, Lahore, and, to the greatest extent, in various parts of
KPK, especially Peshawar — violence and conflict are a result of terrorist attacks led by
various factions of the Pakistani Taliban. According to most accounts, this is closely linked to
the 1980s proxy Cold War in Afghanistan in which the US used Pakistan extensively to
support the Afghans against the Soviets, which lead to a spill-over into Pakistan of weapons,
revenue from the drug trade, a large number of refugees, and eventually of large groups of
radicalised war veterans with few economic prospects after 1989. The attack on Afghanistan
by US forces, after September 11th 2001, once again mobilised many of these groups,
this time against the US and its ally, the government of Pakistan. Since then, terrorist attacks
by the Pakistani Taliban all over the country, drone attacks by the US army within Pakistan’s
tribal belt, and operations by the Pakistan army against various Taliban strongholds
have kept the country in the grip of a deteriorating security situation.
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Within this violence, another source of the polarisation of Pakistan’s society has become
increasingly visible — that based on religion and sectarianism. Religious intolerance has
grown, and a widening web of religion-based violence has come to the fore, based on
differences between various Islamic sects, and between these and other minority religions.
The last two years have seen a particular hike in incidents of such religious intolerance. In
the year 2011–2012, sectarian violence increased by 53 per cent, as compared to nonsectarian attacks, which decreased by 20 per cent (PIPS 2012).9

1.3 Implications for Social Policy
The political and social context of social policy in Pakistan provides a number of political
economy hypotheses for Pakistan’s lagging social development, within which the analysis
presented in Section 2 of this report can be contextualised.
(1) Its particular political history has meant that the power to govern has rested through most
of Pakistan’s history with unelected institutions, such as the army and the bureaucracy.
Political parties are weak and have not been allowed to develop, and many are built around
the individual power of the rural landed elite. The political economy explanation provided by
this is that social policy has suffered through a political process that has had little concern
with representing the needs of the general populace, and in which political actors have not
focused on building a record of social service delivery and performance. In fact, long-term
social programming is rarely a priority in unstable regimes. The fate of elected governments
has often rested on other concerns and their relationship with unelected institutions, and not
on how well they provide to their general electorate. In such systems, elections serve the
purpose not of strengthening democracy but of simply providing an opportunity and
rationale for the landed elite to bring into use all their economic and social power to
periodically revive vote blocs and to strengthen the clientelistic linkages that they embody
(Rouquie 1978; Mohmand 2011).
Authoritarian regimes and clientelistic politics based on traditional, rural power-holders have
had a particularly synergistic relationship in Pakistan. Writing about the experience of Latin
America, Archer (1990) argues that clientelism helps maintain regime stability by reducing
ideological organisation and conflict. This is true of Pakistan. In return, authoritarian
governments at the centre have ensured that they do not deliver universal, non-discretionary
services to villages (Keefer et al. 2003). Other than the rule-based provision of a primary
school in each village and a health centre in each union, all other services are targeted, awaiting
demands from citizens and the intervention of influential actors. This provides the ideal space
within which local landlords can step in and build their reputations as “deliverers” of essential
public services. They deliver services, and people deliver votes. Clientelism thrives on this
targeted pattern of service delivery since the relationship would lose its very logic if the
leader were no longer required as a broker to access public services.
(2) The fact that it is polarised across class, kinship, ethnic, and gender lines means that
those in power have rarely thought in generalised terms beyond the immediate interests

9 The

Express Tribune, January 6th 2013, “Report indicates drastic increase in sectarian violence in 2012”. Available
at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/489677/report-indicates-drastic-increase-in-sectarian-violence-in-2012
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of their own social groups. Landed politicians have avoided the introduction of agricultural
taxation, and, according to some accounts, have worked against greater educational
opportunities for all in order to perpetuate their own power (Husain 1999).
Ethnic groups have worked against one another to maintain their own dominance to the
exclusion of universal policies. And the fact that all decision-making has been concentrated in
the hands of men — within state institutions and within the family — has meant that women
have not only been marginalised in general, but have been missed as a target group within
social policy. Easterly (2003) extends the thesis that social policy suffers within polarised
societies, and that “the Pakistan case illustrates the principle that the social payoff to foreign
aid is low in a polarized society” and that “Pakistan is the poster-child for the hypothesis
that a society polarized by class, gender, and ethnic group does poorly at providing public
services”. Mohmand (2011) found that in a politically fragmented system it is in the interest
of all — politicians, their vote banks, and even voters themselves — for public service
delivery to be targeted to specific groups.
(3) The recent violence that has erupted in different parts of Pakistan now provides another
reason for why social policy does not receive the attention that it deserves. Instead, the
country has been in crisis mode, with the government focused either on the daily acts of
terrorism and religious violence, or on its own survival vis-à-vis other institutions, such as
the army, and, more recently, the judiciary. Most respondents during our interviews in
Islamabad pointed out that the severity of the current situation worked against the
government’s ability to concentrate on any social policy.

1.4 Decentralisation
Part of Pakistan’s lagging performance on social development has been blamed on political
and administrative structures that weakened political and bureaucratic accountability to
citizens (Mohmand & Cheema 2007). The evolution of these structures has been explained above,
as has been the fact that they were characterised by (a) centralisation, (b) bureaucratisation,
and (c) clientelist politics. This system persisted through both military and civilian regimes,
and, under both types of rule, most decisions regarding service delivery, including budgetary
allocations, were made by the federal government, and, to a lesser extent, by provincial governments.
The distance between those that use services and those that make decisions about these has,
therefore, been large and has reduced the accountability of service providers to citizens.
This also means that social service delivery often reflects the preferences of those that make
the decisions at the centre, and not those that use these across the length and breadth of the
country (Easterly 2003). Pakistan has, however, instituted decentralisation10 at various points
in its history. This section provides a contextual analysis of the broader process of devolution
in Pakistan, in terms of the historical trend and the motivations and forces behind it, as this
has implications for the later analysis of the resulting politics of nutrition at the provincial
level, and the split of responsibilities between provincial and federal levels.

10 This

report uses the term ‘decentralisation’ to refer to the various types of political and administrative reforms in
this area over the years in Pakistan. The most current set of reforms in the country is generally referred to as ‘devolution’,
a form of administrative decentralisation that transfers decision-making power from a higher level of government to
a lower one.
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1.4.1 History of Decentralisation
Decentralisation has had a chequered history in Pakistan, with a few patterns that can be
generalised: (a) it has been popular with military governments and not civilian ones, with each
military regime devolving power to district-level bodies, bypassing the provinces in the
process; (b) the 2010 devolution of power to the provinces is the first time that decentralisation
has involved the provinces, and is also the first time that devolution has been instituted by a
civilian, elected government; (c) decentralisation has so far proved to be an unstable, short-lived
reform in Pakistan, with each such effort being undone by the government that follows; and (d)
given this particular history of decentralisation, the relationship between the provinces and
districts has not been particularly strong.
Prior to the most recent round of devolution, three major experiments with local government
reforms had been tried in Pakistan— the Basic Democracies Order (BDO) of 1959, the Local
Government Ordinance (LGO) of 1979, and the LGO of 2001. Interestingly, all of these
reforms were instituted by military regimes, and each local government reform was part of a
wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to centralise political power in the hands
of the military (Cheema & Mohmand 2003). The dual objectives of decentralisation and
centralisation manifest in Pakistan’s three waves of local government reform created tensions
between the different structures and tiers of the state and its different actors. Two of these
tensions that are relevant to the most recent set of devolution reforms are: (a) those between
elected political actors and the bureaucracy; and (b) those between the provinces and the districts.
These tensions are also a result of the larger political economy of civil-military contests over
the restructuring of the state in Pakistan, and the consequent development of its institutions.
Tensions between elected local bodies and the bureaucracy
Bureaucratic primacy over local governments was established by the colonial British state,
which allowed members of these bodies to be nominated by the bureaucracy, and by
declaring officials as chairmen of local councils (Inayatullah 1963). As recounted earlier,
when Pakistan came into being, its ruling party turned to the bureaucracy to help enforce
centralised authority over the entire country (Jalal 1994). A strong disincentive against
representative government at any level, provided by the demographic majority of the East
Pakistani population, kept power in the hands of the bureaucracy through the early years.
Both BDO 1959 and LGO 1979 reduced the power of elected actors and institutions
vis-à-vis the central military regime and the bureaucracy (Cheema & Mohmand 2003).
It was under Musharraf’s LGO 2001 that the provincial bureaucracy was made accountable to
elected local governments for the first time, and no longer had the power to suspend these
local bodies. The structure of the old district administration was also altered, with the
abolishment of the office of the District Commissioner (DC), and its replacement with the
office of the District Coordination Officer (DCO), who reported to the elected district nazim.
Yet, despite all this, bureaucratic accountability to an elected tier was limited by the fact that
DCOs and Executive District Officers (EDOs) continued to be a part of the federal and provincial
cadres, and all decisions regarding promotions and transfers were taken by their provincial
secretariats. Newspapers at this time contained frequent references to tussles between elected
district nazims and DCOs who were allegedly under the instruction of the provincial
bureaucracy (Cheema & Mohmand 2003).
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Tensions between the provincial and district levels of government
The close relationship between centralising military regimes and decentralised local governments
has generally marginalised the provincial tier of government. During the various LGOs,
powers were devolved from the provinces to local governments, but not from the federal
level to provinces to compensate for this, leaving the latter with limited, circumscribed power
(World Bank 2000). This created a lack of ownership of local governments at the provincial
level, and limited both the ability of provincial governments to function fully and the capacity
of local governments to deliver services effectively. The tension between these tiers of
government came to the fore repeatedly during Musharraf’s era, when the federal government
had to play the role of referee between provinces and local governments on various occasions.
For example, in Karachi, the provincial government, despite legislative requirements, was
reluctant to fully devolve the Karachi Building Control Authority (KCBA), the Karachi Water
and Sewerage Board (KWSB) and the property tax department to the district because it was
seen as a major dent in its ability to provide patronage. In fact, this concern of losing sources
of patronage became so intense that the federal government re-instituted an older practise
of assigning block funds for development schemes identified by Members of National and
Provincial Assemblies (MNAs and MPAs) (Cheema & Mohmand 2003).
On the other hand, civilian governments have sought to strengthen the federal structure by
empowering provinces whenever they have been in power. The fact that most of Pakistan’s
political parties have provincial bases of power, or have been in ruling coalitions with parties
that do, has provided them with a major incentive for strengthening this tier of government
and a disincentive to substantively empower what they perceive as a competing tier of political
patronage at the local level. These tensions have been reinforced over Pakistan’s history by an
absence of political linkages between party-based higher tiers of government and the local tier,
where elections were held on a non-party basis under each decentralisation reform (Wilder 1999).
This has meant that political parties lack political ownership of local government reforms,
and so each time a civilian government came into power, local governments were disbanded.
This was not hard to do since each of Pakistan’s decentralisation reforms discussed so far —
BDO 1959, LGO 1979, and LGO 2001 — were passed as Orders or Ordinances by the
President, which means that they were not passed through parliament and had no
constitutional protection. LGO 2001 was eventually passed as provincial legislation, and it
was up to this tier to call elections when the term of local governments elected in 2005 came
to an end in October 2009. However, by this time, the Musharraf regime that had instituted
LGO 2001 had fallen and the PPP was once again in power, with various other parties in
power in the provinces. In keeping with the trend, the new civilian governments did not call
for local government elections, and so the local bodies were once again discontinued and
remain so to this day.
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1.4.2 18th Amendment and the Devolution of 2010
At the same time, as the term of local governments was coming to an end, the new PPP
government was drafting the 18th Amendment to the Constitution that introduced a different
type of decentralisation to Pakistan for the first time in its history by entirely devolving a
number of ministries from the federal level to the provinces. The 18th Amendment, passed
in April 2010, sought to return the Constitution to its 1973 formulation by purging it of
later amendments introduced by Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime, and, in the process, also
empowered provinces as never before by devolving 17 ministries from the centre to the
provinces, including the ministries of health, education, food and agriculture, women
development, and social welfare and special education.11 In other words, most ministries
with interventions related to nutrition were now under provincial control.
Along with this, the Concurrent Legislative List was abolished to give provinces the exclusive
right to legislate on 40 of the 47 subjects listed in it, with issues like criminal law, criminal
procedure, and evidence laws added to the Federal Legislative List to avoid the creation of
five separate law codes (Social Policy and Development Centre [SPDC] 2012, Almeida 2010,
Waseem 2010). Other subjects from both the Concurrent list and the Federal List were
moved to a revitalised Council of Common Interests — originally set up under the 1973
Constitution, but greatly strengthened by the 18th Amendment — that is chaired by the
Prime Minister, includes all four provincial Chief Ministers along with three other federal
government members, and so represents a coordinated federal-provincial effort at the
formulation and regulation of certain policies (SPDC 2012). It also serves as a dispute
resolution body between the provinces and the centre on issues such as water use and the
distribution of natural resources.
This round of decentralisation, unlike the ones that went before it, is considered to have
met a long-standing political demand of the regional party structure of Pakistan — Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) based in Punjab; Awami National Party’s (ANP’s) supporters
are mainly from KPK; Baluchistan National Party (BNP) has its base in Baluchistan; PPP,
though a national party, has its strongest constituency in rural Sindh; and the various smaller
parties also have localised bases of support.12 Many of our respondents at the federal level
believe that the speed with which devolution was implemented in the aftermath of its passage
through parliament and senate — with no transition period and little time to design a careful
rolling out of responsibilities to the provinces — testifies to the fact that it was a response
to a political demand, rather than to meet an administrative demand to improve service
delivery or channels of accountability.
Another departure from the past is the fact that the current decentralisation reforms were
passed as a constitutional amendment through a two-thirds majority in parliament, making
11The

others include: Zakat and Ushr, Population Welfare, Youth Affairs, Local Government and Rural Development,
Culture, Tourism, Livestock and Dairy Development, Minority Affairs, Sports, Environment, Labour and Manpower,
and Special Initiatives.
12 The MQM is the one exception to this rule, since its support is concentrated in the cities of Sindh, and as such, the
local government system offers it greater control than does provincial autonomy. This is because whilst Karachi is
divided into 20 national assembly constituencies and 42 provincial assembly constituencies, it all falls under one city
government and its nazim as per LGO 2001, and five city districts under SPGLO 2012.
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them far more sustainable than the reforms of the past. This does not, however, mean that the
effort is completely non-reversible. In fact, within the first two years, eight new ministries
were created at the centre, and, according to some of our respondents, part of the reason for
this was to return decision-making power over certain functions back to the centre. For example,
though the Ministry of Environment was devolved, seen by some commentators as a hasty and
problematic decision, some of its functions were soon returned to the centre through the new
federal Ministry of Climate Change, and that “most of the functions of new ministries are
essentially the same as their predecessors” (SPDC 2012). Similarly, a new federal Ministry of
Food Security and Research has recentralised coordination and planning around food and
agriculture, whilst the new Ministry of National Harmony has replaced the devolved Ministry
of Minority Affairs.13 Furthermore, many functions of the devolved ministries have also been
retained at the federal level, so that of the “301 entries in the allocated business of devolved
ministries and divisions…only 94 functions have actually been devolved while 207 functions
have been retained by the federal government” (SPDC 2012).
There are concerns that whilst power may have been devolved from the centre to the
provinces, it is now being centralised, along with resources, within provincial capitals and
is not being devolved further to sub-provincial tiers of government. Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta,
and Karachi are still far away from the country’s rural hinterlands. As Easterly (2001) puts it,
“for Punjab’s population of 73 million, for example, the provincial government in Lahore
makes the decisions on how many textbooks and medicines will make it to some remote rural
backwater”14. Since local governments are a provincial subject under the constitution, it is up
to the newly empowered provincial governments to devolve power further to districts, but few
have shown a willingness to do so, and have instead revived the old bureaucratic offices at the
local level to help deliver services. In each province, the elections are overdue and the issue
has been taken to court, which ordered the governments to call local government elections.
The 18th Amendment also added this to the Constitution as Article 140(A).15 By continuing to
operate without local governments, provinces are now in contravention of both the courts
\and the Constitution. The Punjab and Sindh governments have both formulated Local
Government Acts (LGAs) but have yet to institute these, and according to one analysis, “the
proposed LGA of Punjab represents a retreat from the wide ranging functions transferred to
local governments in 2001” (SPDC 2012). In Sindh, the PPP government’s attempt to institute
the Sindh People’s Local Government Ordinance (SPLGO 2012) to appease the demands of its
coalition partner Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) — a party that lost considerable power
through the disbanding of local governments and gained little in return through provincial
devolution — has met considerable controversy and has been challenged in court by other
political parties.16

13 Other

newly created ministries at the centre include: Capital Administration and Development, Human Resource
Development, National Harmony, National Heritage and Integration, National Regulation and Services, and Professional
and Technical Training.
14 This changed after the implementation of LGO 2001, but during the current round of devolution, there has again
been a decline in the districts’ non-salary/development expenditures compared to the provincial government (Interview
with government official).
15 (1) Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative, and
financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments. (2) Elections to the local
governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
16 Much of the opposition is based on the ethnic fragmentation of Sindh across its Sindhi-majority rural areas and
muhajir-majority urban areas — and the further fragmentation of the urban population across various feuding ethnic
groups — which has led most ethnic groups to fear what the muhajir-led MQM’s control of Sindh’s resource-wealthy
urban areas will mean for the rest of the province.
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1.4.3 National Finance Commission Awards
Though the 18th Amendment instituted far-reaching administrative reforms, it did not include
fiscal devolution, and revenue-raising is still concentrated at the federal level. The one exception
to this is the General Sales Tax (GST) on services, which was devolved under the amendment
and will now be collected by the provinces. This is a large tax, and both Sindh and Punjab have
created new revenue collection mechanisms to deal with this (Burki 2011). Aside from this,
traditionally 91 per cent of revenue in Pakistan has been raised by the centre, eight to nine per
cent by the provinces, and only about one per cent by local bodies.17 Provinces spend 28 per cent
of revenue whilst raising only eight per cent and this gap has been met by fiscal transfers from
the centre. In other words, the fiscal system is based on a resource-transfer regime that has been
key to the control of provinces by the centre. Throughout the country’s 65-year history, the centre
has determined provincial resources by collecting all taxes at the centre and then transferring
these to the provinces according to formulas set in the NFC award.
The NFC award has an interesting history. The NFC was first constituted under Article 160(1)
of the 1973 Constitution, with the federal finance minister as its chairperson and provincial
finance ministers as its members, along with a few more nominated experts. The Constitution
requires that the NFC be constituted every five years to review and consequently revise the level
of revenue transfers from the federal government to the provinces to meet their current expenditure
needs, and that the award be instituted strictly through a consensus developed between the federal
and provincial governments. Because of this, although there have been seven NFC awards so
far, only four of these managed to build consensus and have therefore been instituted.18 These
were in 1974, 1991, 1997, and, most recently, in 2009. Each of these has been under a democratically
elected government. Despite multiple attempts, no military government in Pakistan’s history has
managed to get a consensus around an NFC transfer. The NFC has, therefore, worked as the polar
opposite of local government reforms, which have only been possible during military regimes.
Each of the NFC awards that were instituted expanded the scope of the transfers, and included
more and more taxes, but population remained the sole criteria for the allocation of resources
to the provinces (Table 1) (Ahmed, Mustafa, & Khalid 2007). The seventh and most recent NFC
award of 2009 is considered a breakthrough in this system by most commentators, and by some,
as an even more important achievement for the PPP government than the 18th Amendment. For
the first time, the criteria for horizontal distribution amongst the provinces was diversified away
from demographic proportionality — a criteria that was seen to have favoured Punjab at the

17 Interview,
18 Funds

October 2012, Lahore.
are still transferred but under the agreements of the previous NFC.
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expense of the other provinces — to accommodate the demands of the other three provinces.
KPK had always demanded that poverty and underdevelopment be added to the distribution
formula; Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest province in terms of territory, had wanted area to be a
factor, and Sindh, the province that raises most of Pakistan’s revenue, wanted revenue-generation
and -collection to be included as criterion. All of these are now part of the distribution criteria,
though population was still weighted at 82 per cent of the whole, poverty/backwardness at 10.3
per cent, revenue collection and generation at 5 per cent (2.5 per cent each) and area/inverse
population density at 2.7 per cent. Even though this meant that Punjab would still receive the
mammoth share of resources, it did face a cut of about 5.62 per cent in its share for the first
time in the award’s history. This portion went largely to Baluchistan, whose share was increased
by 3.98 per cent; whilst Sindh and KPK received 0.84 and 0.80 per cent increases respectively
(Table 1). To compensate and match Punjab’s foregoing of its share, the federal level reduced
its own share by 10 per cent to 44 per cent of the total divisible pool. This 18 per cent reduction
since the 1997 share, together with the fact that the 1997 expansion of the divisible pool was
maintained as such, meant that this was the largest resource transfer to the provinces in Pakistan’s
history. It represented an additional budget of 175 per cent for Baluchistan, 79 per cent for KPK,
61 per cent for Sindh, and 48 per cent for Punjab (Mustafa 2011).
Table 1: History of NFC awards

Source: Ahmed, Mustafa, & Khalid 2007; Mustafa 2011.
* Per cent shares in this year are based on the 1981 census.
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However, the 2009 NFC award preceded the 18th Amendment by one year. From the
provincial perspective, when 17 ministries and all the functions of the Concurrent List were
transferred to them in the following year, the new fiscal transfers fell short of the additional
demands placed on them by devolution. Also, according to some respondents, the NFC projected
growth and tax collections too optimistically, and, since these have been severely affected in the
three years since then, provincial shares have not been as large as originally forecast. Nevertheless,
according to our respondents, provinces appear to now be far less in debt than they were
earlier, and some provinces have even been able to register a surplus (SPDC 2012).
Overall, the new multi-dimensional distribution criteria added to the NFC and the far-reaching
empowerment of the provinces by the 18th Amendment have created an entirely new level of
consensus between the centre and the provinces, and a fully restructured system for social
service delivery. Whilst this should have dealt effectively with the province’s previous disincentive
for performing well within a restrictive environment in which they had circumscribed powers,
it must be noted that provinces are essentially still in a state of transition. This is the first time
that such extensive decision-making and planning powers, together with the resources to
finance these, have been devolved to them, and it would not be wrong to expect that provinces
have limited capacity at the moment to deal with all this. It will take provinces longer than the
two to three years that have lapsed since these extensive changes were instituted to build their
capacity for fully devolved decision-making and service delivery at the provincial level.
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2

NUTRITION GOVERNANCE AT
THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Pakistan’s generally non-representative political system, in which power has been concentrated
in the hands of non-elected institutions, is now undergoing a democratic transition that is a long
way from consolidation. Power is shifting towards elected actors, but the political system is
unstable. Political parties still do not have programmatic linkages with voters and their clientelist
electoral logic has worked against the development of effective universal and sustained social
policies. This is aggravated by a socially heterogeneous and polarised society in which those in
power have rarely thought in generalised terms beyond the immediate interests of their own
social groups. Women, ethnic minorities, and lower-class groups have not been sufficiently
targeted by specifically designed programmes, and attention has been diverted away from social
policy by the recent acceleration in conflict across the country. Furthermore, an empowered local
government system is missing and is still not a favoured option as far as mainstream political
parties are concerned.
Nevertheless, various opportunities have recently emerged. A democratic transition is underway;
the previous PPP-led government completed its term, becoming only the second elected government
in Pakistan’s history to do so (following Bhutto’s 1971–1977 term); a relatively peaceful election
led to the transition of power to another elected government, signalling a possible consolidation
of democracy; a long-standing demand of political parties for provincial autonomy has finally
been met through the far-reaching 18th Amendment; NFC 2009 is considered ground-breaking
and has further empowered provinces vis-à-vis the centre; and consensus between political parties,
both in government and opposition, and between the federal and provincial levels, has been at
an all-time high over the last 5 years. However, the entire system is in a state of transition, and
general capacity to deal with this scale of change is still limited. It is within this context that we
now turn to look at nutrition governance in Pakistan.
In this study, we focus on actors and institutions, and analyse in particular the impact of specific
governance factors on improved nutrition outcomes, which include: well-designed, multidimensional social policies that are well-aligned with the incentives of political actors, and
strategies that are supported by multiple stakeholders both within and outside the government,
and that are coordinated through the implementation of nutrition policies and programmes. This
section looks at three main dimensions of nutrition governance:




Horizontal, or inter-sectoral, coordination across government, donors and other non
state actors;
Vertical coordination within the country’s nutrition policy and implementation systems;
The modes of funding that are available for the implementation of nutrition policy and
programmes.

It also looks at how monitoring and data systems may support or undermine these forms of
coordination and organisation. In doing so, this study moves beyond a discussion of healthspecific interventions and recommendations to focus instead on governance-related
explanations and interventions that focus on the roles that policy, actors, and institutions
play. This approach leads the study to conclude that undernutrition in Pakistan remains high
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because of a lack of cross-sectoral collaboration between the different institutions that deal with
this issue, a lack of a strong national agenda against undernutrition that emanates from within
the highest executive offices of the state, and a lack of consistent monitoring of the situation
using reliable data. Instead, nutrition has received little attention in Pakistan to date and has been
dealt with through a bureaucratic approach with few incentives for state officials to go beyond
their prescribed functions. Attention has increased in recent years both within the state and within
donor groups in the wake of national emergencies, but undernutrition has not yet become a
political or electoral issue, the legislature is not involved, and the issue has garnered no executive
interest from the top political offices of the country.

2.1

Horizontal Coordination between Federal Actors

The framework of this study defines horizontal coordination as the efforts made by the government
to discuss, adopt, and implement nutrition policies across different government sectors, and with
the support of nongovernment agencies. In Pakistan, cooperation between state and non-state
organisations on undernutrition has been limited to date because nutrition is new on everyone’s
agenda. Nutrition has historically received little attention from the state in Pakistan, but, in March
2012, this changed to some extent when the Prime Minister made a few statements about food
security, connecting it to hunger and undernutrition. A new ministry on Food Security was then
set up with the aim of developing plans and policies to deal with hunger and undernutrition, to
mobilise and coordinate international support, and to monitor progress. Around the same time,
the 2010 and 2011 floods in Pakistan — of a magnitude that caused national emergencies —
drew donor and civil society attention to undernutrition as the situation acutely worsened amongst
the affected population. As a consequence of these events, nutrition appears to have emerged on
the agenda, but this is a recent phenomenon.
2.1.1 Nutrition Policy
Pakistan has historically lacked a clear, focused national policy, strategy, or action plan for
reducing its high rates of undernutrition. In 2002, the PC formulated the National Nutrition
Strategic Plan, together with an action plan targeted at reducing micronutrient malnutrition in
Pakistan, but these were never implemented. A significant move forward, however, came in 2011
with PINS, which is today in its preliminary stages of adoption, and sets out an incremental plan
for the implementation of a host of nutrition-related interventions. At the same time, inter-sectoral
nutrition strategies are being drafted in each of the four provinces and three regions of Pakistan,
with the support of UNICEF. After the operational plan of PINS was presented in June 2011, the
results of the NNS were presented in September 2011. The high incidence of undernutrition
reported by the survey, together with the shocking fact that the rates had not changed much over
the last ten years, garnered both media and policy attention. Just the fact that the survey had been
conducted at all meant that after years of neglect, attention was slowly drawn in this direction,
in part because of the extenuating circumstances of the floods. PINS and NNS 2011 had both
put nutrition on the map of policymakers.
Another major issue with nutrition has been its lack of a permanent home. In the 1970s, it
was housed within the PC, guided by the belief that it should be dealt with through a multisectoral approach. It remained there until 2002, when a Nutrition Wing was set up within the
MoH to allow greater ownership over the issue to an implementing institution. MoH developed
a development programme proposal (PC-1), called the “Enhanced Nutrition Programme”,
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but its approval by the PC was stalled by the ensuing process of devolution in 2009. When the
MoH was devolved at this time to the four separate Departments of Health in each province,
nutrition was left behind, and, according to one government official, “it was point No. 11 on the
list of functions to be devolved, but was left out because it had never been fully integrated into
the work of the MoH, or been owned as a responsibility”.
Ownership appears to have been the greatest problem for nutrition. As a respondent from a donor
agency put it, “We know the menu of options to reduce malnutrition. But who is going to adopt
this and push for this within the government?” Post-devolution, nutrition has gone back to the
PC, which now houses a Nutrition Wing, after making a temporary stop at the Inter-Provincial
Coordination Division (IPC), and, according to some respondents, this will once again create
issues of unclear ownership when it comes to implementation, since PC is not an implementing
agency. Underlying much of this is the fact that whilst a nutrition strategy is now available, there
is still no nutrition policy to regularise the issue within the regular working of ministries.
Instead, it is still dealt with through the development budget of the PC — “as a PC-1 project
proposal”19 — rather than an integrated part of the recurrent budget of the Ministry of
Finance.
2.1.2 Inter-sectoral Coordination
Coordination between different ministries and departments
Nutrition is multi-sectoral by nature. In the words of a government official, “To deal with the
issue of nutrition you do not have to define its implementation. Instead, you need to define what
other related sectors should be doing. You need to set targets within other sectors in order to
reduce malnutrition as a whole”. This requires that multiple sectors and actors coordinate their
strategies and actions. However, of the host of interventions implemented by the government
over the years — including “fortification of edible oil/ghee with vitamin A; supplementary feeding
of vulnerable groups…; IDD-National program which uses social marketing to create demand
for and support to 600+ producers to increase supply of iodized salt; mass vitamin A supplementation;
national wheat fortification (iron and folate) program and; the Prime Minister’s program for
Family Planning and Primary Health Care which uses Lady Health Workers to provide nutrition
education, maternal and child health care and iron/foliate supplementation of pregnant women”—
few have been coordinated across ministries and departments, and responsibilities have often
not been clearly delineated (World Bank 2009). Instead, as one scholar put it, “government
departments work as fragmented, polarised fiefdoms”.
The post-devolution scenario has reduced clarity even further during what is essentially a transition
phase. At the top-most level, responsibility for nutrition has now once again been delegated to
the PC. At the same time, however, the National Institute of Health, which houses a Nutrition

19 Interview

with government official, Oct 2012, Islamabad.
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Wing and was earlier under the MoH, is now under the IPC. The IPC also now houses some
vertical health programmes, and, together with the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of the
Ministry of Finance, it coordinates with donors on health interventions before funds are sent to
provinces. Finally, the newly created Ministry of Food Security and Research has taken on some
related functions as well, but there is no formal coordination yet between it and other nutrition
actors. Therefore, there continue to be multiple centres of implementation coordination.
A further problem in the coordination of work across different government departments and nonstate actors is that different actors have very different priorities and objectives. As an example,
whilst various donor groups have come together to push the nutrition agenda, the priority and
discourse of the legislature are defined by the issue of food security, whilst the PC — where
nutrition resides — frames the issue in terms of economic growth. However, sector working
groups are now being established within the government under the Foreign Assistance Policy
Framework (FAPF) that will allow coordination between different line ministries at the federal
and provincial levels around identified sectors and allow them to identify integrated needs to
donors and work towards common results (OECD 2012).
Many respondents expressed scepticism towards the need for, and feasibility of, a multi-sectoral
approach to deal with undernutrition. Others expressed reservations about the feasibility of all
stakeholders being equally motivated and aware. Finally, other doubts exist as to how multisectorality would actually work in practise. On the one hand, if all partners were to be given an
equal role, little might be done due to a lack of leadership since, without primary ownership and
a champion, inter-sectoral coordination might allow sectors to avoid taking any real responsibility
for improving nutrition, expecting others to do so. As some respondents illustrated, it does not
take long for the regular meetings of coordination bodies — where institutions are often represented
by a single person — to become no more than agenda items on attendees’ monthly schedules.
Alternatively, if one institution was to take the lead, turf wars could emerge as each sector attempts
to protect its own priorities vis-à-vis the lead institution. Respondents pointed out that within
Pakistan’s hierarchical bureaucratic structure, departmental staff will not easily take directives
from another line ministry of equal status. Consequently, it is not clear which actor has the
influence and power not only to lead multiple line ministries in terms of strategy and planning,
but also into implementation.
According to one respondent from a donor agency, stressing multi-sectorality as more important
than issues of actual implementation may be repeating old mistakes. According to him, nutrition
has already had a history of being housed within the PC since the 1970s, with the objective of
encouraging a multi-sectoral approach, but this led to almost no progress on implementation. In
fact, an oft-repeated phrase throughout interviews in Islamabad was, “think and plan multisectorally, but implement sectorally”. In other words, the discourse at the federal level calls for
a multi-stakeholder coordinating council at the centre to identify interventions for separate and
tailored implementation by each nutrition-related department in the provinces.

20 Also

from interviews with government officials and donor organisations, Oct 2012, Islamabad.
raises an interesting issue because all four new provincial PC-1s on nutrition have once again come from the
departments of health.
21 This
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Coordination between the state and donor groups
Coordination between the state and donor groups has also been growing through the establishment
of various forums and the joint production of analyses. However, according to an Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) evaluation of aid effectiveness, only about
one-third of the total funds provided by development partners to Pakistan in 2010 were given
through “the use of common arrangements within Programme-Based Approaches (PBAs)” —
31 per cent, as compared to the target of 66 per cent (OECD 2012). In terms of sharing the burden
of work through jointly conducted missions, the score is 17 per cent, as compared to the target
of 40 per cent, with the UN, World Bank, and DFID leading the way on coordinated work, but
even there “none of them managed to co-ordinate more than half of their missions” (OECD
2012).
On the other hand, as far as “analytic work” is concerned — “country or sector studies and
strategies, country evaluations and discussion papers” — the target of 66 per cent has almost
been met, with 60 per cent of all such efforts being undertaken in conjunction with state actors.
Some examples of this have already been mentioned: the NNS 2011 was a joint effort of the
Nutrition Wing of the MoH, AKU’s Division of Women and Child Health, the Pakistan Medical
Research Council, and UNICEF, with financial support from DFID and Australian Government
Overseas Aid Program (AusAid); and PINS also brought together the government and donor
groups, led by UNICEF and supported by WFP and FAO.
Furthermore, D-10 is a forum that brings together the government and donors on a monthly basis,
and provides an ideal platform for coordination between the two groups on social spending, with
a recent specific focus on nutrition. D-10 is chaired by the EAD, and includes government
representatives from the PC, the IPC, and the provinces, as well as ambassadors from the major
donor countries. The D-10 has resulted in the production of PINS, and the provincial nutrition
strategies that are now to follow. Donor groups in Pakistan have also made an effort to coordinate
their own work across the various development partners that are currently active in the country.
The One-UN system is moving the various UN agencies towards a more integrated engagement
with partner countries, with Pakistan identified as a pilot country and nutrition identified as one
of the strategic priorities. The World Bank also leads the Pakistan Nutrition Partners group, which
meets once a month and has contributed to coordinating the work of development partners.
At the same time, some respondents within the state pointed out that despite these forums; donor
contribution is not coordinated by the state. EAD has primary responsibility to approve and
coordinate donor funds, but it has no real tracking and monitoring mechanisms to be able to do
so. According to one government official, “it acts as simply a post office that passes projects
between donors and the Planning Commission”, and has not taken on the role of integrating these
funds within a larger, strategic framework for interventions around a few priority areas. This is
complicated further by the fact that projects below a stipulated amount need not go through EAD

22 The

integration around food and nutrition would bring together UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and UN Habitat.
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at all, and so monitoring becomes even harder. The lack of a national agenda or strategy
equally concerns donors, since it could render aid ineffective. There is, however, a possibility
that under the FAPF and the joint-sector working groups formed under it, together with
the establishment of joint targets and action plans, the government will be able to move
towards taking the lead on planning and strategising around the particular needs of each
of its sectors.
2.1.3 Nutrition Actors and their Incentives
What is the incentive of any actor to work on nutrition? This appears to be the foundation
point underlying not only the possibility of multi-sectoral coordination, but also whether or not
nutrition will find a sustainable home and ownership in Pakistan. In other words, the context of
nutrition policy in Pakistan is defined to a very large extent by the incentives of the various
stakeholders, which in turn are defined by the political and social context detailed in Part I.
This section disaggregates incentives across a range of actors.
Politicians
The incentives of politicians are quite simply defined by the need for re-election. To this end,
they need two things: (a) initiatives with which they can clearly be identified that can get them
votes in the next election and (b) interventions that deliver results within their five-year terms.
Nutrition lends itself to neither of these — there are few quick wins, and long-term efforts are
required for slow, incremental gains that are rarely visible. The electoral incentives for political
actors to work on nutrition are, therefore, low. Politicians in Pakistan have also shown a particular
interest in delivering targeted services to their communities through clientelist linkages that have
prevented the development of larger mass constituencies around the demand for universal social
services (see Section 2). So whilst they may want to deliver food, build sanitation systems, and
improve the state of Basic Health Units (BHUs) within their own constituencies — or more often
within the villages that vote for them — they are rarely interested in developing policies
on universal service or improving delivery systems in general. The focus of politics is shifting
towards social delivery, and the vote is increasingly negotiated with the electorate, but
voters still tend to seek private goods through individual demands, rather than organising
into constituencies to demand collective public goods (Mohmand 2011).
At the same time, politicians are ideal candidates as champions of a cause. They are highprofile, receive lots of media coverage, and, when in power, have influence over policy and
implementation. However, it is easier to involve them in a cause once its urgency has already
been recognised. The attention that nutrition received from the office of the Prime Minister in
2011–2012 was in no small part because of the release of the NNS and its widely reported
findings. This moment could have been used to build more sustainable political support for
the issue. On the other hand, the issue of regularising LHWs grew in magnitude only after a
politician decided to champion it.
In summary, in order to get politicians on board, one needs:
1. Clear, simple messages that can be converted into electoral slogans.
2. Specific interventions that may produce quick results within their term in office, even
though these may not represent the whole spectrum of activities required to reduce
undernutrition.
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Bureaucracy
The incentives of the bureaucracy are defined by executive and ministerial orders, and by targets
set internally within their sectors. It is not unusual to hear that bureaucrats will perform on an
issue when it is given a high priority by political actors, especially ministers. The terms of
bureaucrats are in principle longer than those of politicians, but unless they have performancebased indicators to evaluate their work, the incentive to perform beyond defined targets and for
taking personal initiative is low. Government officials in Pakistan have low salaries relative to
their workloads, and, in comparison to other sectors, M&E systems are weak, and reporting
structures are extremely hierarchical and centralised. This has made the bureaucracy inefficient
in managing its expanding scope of functions, and prone to graft and rent-seeking behaviour
(ICG 2010).
A disproportionate amount of civil servants’ time is consumed by internal procedures. “Even the
recruitment or transfer of clerks and other low-level support staff cannot take place without the
approval of the secretary or at times even the minister, distracting senior officials from more vital
tasks of implementing government policy” (ICG 2010). Overall, the bureaucracy in Pakistan is
considered to be far more concerned with its own procedures and administrative structures than
with responding to public demands and the need to improve service delivery — focused to a
greater extent on inputs than on outputs and outcomes. Their performance is evaluated each
year through the Annual Confidential Reports (ACR), but these tend to be “subjective
evaluations of officers’ character” rather than based on objective, performance-oriented
criteria (ICG 2010).
Government departments can also become highly politicised over certain issues. According to
one respondent who is an ex-bureaucrat, the Department of Food should ideally have a great
incentive to take on nutrition-related targets, but the department is heavily politicised around the
politics of wheat and land. Politicisation of the bureaucracy has also resulted in short tenures
for senior officials. A Secretary’s average term, according to a respondent from a research
institution, is about seven months. This has taken away one of the bureaucracy’s traditional
advantages — permanence, with the space and time to see long-term projects through, especially
those that deliver slow results and that are generally not prioritised by politicians.
Bureaucrats work to meet targets defined by policy. In order to get them on board, one would
need:
1. Clearly defined policy and implementation targets with action plans.
2. Evidence-based criteria for monitoring and evaluating performance.
3. Resources that are connected to performance and results.
Planning Commission and the Planning & Development Departments
Within the state, the government has decided that responsibility for nutrition lies with the PC and
that this is the federal focal point. This makes sense to many respondents, given that it is the site
of development finance and strategy convergence, and given that in its planning and development
role, the PC is multi-sectoral by nature. There is also a common demand across provincial
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departments for the nomination of a nutrition focal person within each P&DD to take the lead
over inter-sectoral coordination in the provinces. There are, however, three problems with this
arrangement. First, whilst the PC can define overall objectives and coordinate across ministries,
it is not an implementing agency and thus cannot take on primary responsibility for nutrition.
Second, sub-provincial district staff responsible for implementation report to departmental
secretaries and not to P&DD. Finally, according to our provincial reports, each P&DD has so
far shown a low level of interest in taking on primary responsibility for nutrition.
The PC has little incentive for being the focal point on nutrition. First, reducing undernutrition
requires regular, recurring activities across a number of implementing line ministries as opposed
to a project-based approach, which is essentially what the PC specialises in.23 It may, therefore,
be questionable whether nutrition should be housed there in the first place. In addition, it should
have a dedicated budget from the Ministry of Finance rather than the development budget that
the PC possesses. Second, under its current leadership, the PC has a clear focus on growth, with
the Framework for Economic Growth as its main planning document. It advocates that prioritising
growth will eventually lead to social spending, and this defines the PC’s thinking on nutrition
as well. This is not how donors, who view good nutrition as a means to achieving growth,
approach the issue. Both of these approaches can be supported by different literature. There is,
therefore, a large disconnect between the focus and discourse of the PC — defined by ‘growth
for nutrition’ — and that of the World Bank-led donor group on nutrition — defined by ‘nutrition
for growth’. This essentially sets apart the incentives of the main funders of nutrition interventions
— the donor community — and the federal focal point for nutrition, the PC.
According to some respondents, the fact that post-devolution nutrition has gone back to the PC
does not reflect the Commission’s capacity for dealing with the issue, but rather indicates a
continuing lack of ownership and an attempt to pass the responsibility on to someone else. Also,
the fact that P&DDs were suggested as the preferred coordinating body in the provinces may
reflect how difficult it may be to get other ministries to cooperate when leadership is vested in
one line ministry of equal status. For all of these reasons, the establishment of a separate operational
forum was suggested, such as a Nutrition Council with the authority to convene a broad array
of actors from both the federal and provincial governments.
Provincial governments
Whilst the PC held on to federal responsibility for nutrition after the devolution of 2010, most
nutrition-related ministries were devolved. Soon after, the process of developing provincial
nutrition strategies was started with donor support, and multi-sectoral nutrition committees were
formed in Punjab and Sindh. However, respondents are concerned that most coordination is still
simply on paper whilst, in effect, provincial departments are generally unaware of one

23 Interview

with government official, Islamabad, Oct 2012.
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another’s work, are as yet unsure of the exact priority that nutrition is to be afforded within their
own department, and will not have the capacity to implement the majority of the plans currently
under development. There is significant disagreement between respondents on the post-devolution
relationship between the centre and the provinces on issues of social development. Whilst some
are now careful about treading on provincial toes and insist that nothing can now be initiated at
the centre, others insist that strategy still needs to be centrally defined and that provincial line
departments may need to be incentivised, through a central coordinating body such as the Nutrition
Council, and with matching funds from the PC, to actually prioritise and integrate nutrition
into their work.
Provinces have much to prove right now, having only recently achieved a long-demanded but
hard-won battle for greater autonomy vis-à-vis the centre. It would be in their interest to perform
well and not give future governments any reason to argue for re-centralisation in the face of a
failure to deliver by provinces. There is a belief that power and decision-making were transferred
to provinces too quickly and without allowing them a transition period during which they could,
(a) take on functions in an incremental manner based on levels of capacity, and (b) build their
capacity for taking on additional tasks and functions. A government official explained that social
policy in Pakistan has historically been developed at the federal level and then passed on to
provinces for implementation. This led to limited capacity for social policy development in
provincial governments. P&DDs lack in-house capacity to manage technical assistance, and
health departments have traditionally catered only to curative medicine and not preventive health
or nutrition programmes. According to this view, provinces may, therefore, have been ‘set up for
failure’ by giving them too much too soon—more than they could handle right away. Provinces
must be acutely aware of this and, therefore, have a high incentive to perform well to hold on
to their newfound autonomy. Added to this is a new element of competition between the provinces.
Within the new devolved framework, comparisons between the performances of the four provinces
are now regularly made, both by development partners and by the media, and this may act as
another incentive to improve their capacity and their delivery systems.
Donors
Though donor organisations have only recently prioritised nutrition in Pakistan, they are now
firmly behind the agenda and support most of the work in this domain. In fact, the main impetus
for nutrition work has come from the donors in the aftermath of the 2010 flash floods. As one
donor put it, “if we stopped now, it would all fall apart”, referring not only to the lead taken by
donors but also the lack of ownership of nutrition within the government. Traditionally, donors
interacted only with the federal government. This changed in the 2000s when multilaterals, and
later bilaterals, started dealing directly with provinces by setting up sectoral, budgetary support
programmes. Most donor projects are now based in the provinces, but their support is centrally
regulated through EAD of the Ministry of Finance and the IPC. In the area of nutrition, they are
involved in a range of activities, from facilitating the development of the provincial nutrition
strategies to initiating health-sector reforms. The relationship between donors and provinces,
based around specific projects, is much stronger than that between donors and the federal
government around policy.
Despite donor provincial interventions, coordinated through EAD and IPC, and the ongoing
coordination between donors and the Pakistani state via a number of forums, the relationship
between the two sets of actors is far from healthy. It is characterised by deep suspicion and distrust

38

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERNUTRITION NATIONAL REPORT: PAKISTAN

on the part of the government, and an inability by donors to properly engage with the policy
process or policy actors. As more and more donor finance has focused on the social sector, one
government official complained, “Growth seems to have disappeared from the donor’s agenda
for Pakistan. What they want is to provide charity in an environment of poverty”. The government
also accuses donors of not having an institutional approach, in that they do not build relationships
with an entire institution of the state, but rather very often with one actor within an institution,
consequently hinging the sustainability of their work on personal relationships.
On the other hand, donors question the priorities, interest, and effectiveness of the government,
and insist that the government lacks the political will to deliver on social services. The relationship
between the two actors is also affected by the implications of Pakistan’s conflict-ridden national
situation, in that the constant fear of violence has led to extremely high turnover rates within
some agencies. In the case of one agency, staff members spend no more than one year in the
country and consider the few that are in their second year as their country experts. Donor staff
spend time within fortified office complexes, are limited in their movements around the country
and even within the cities in which they live, and they have few linkages with national actors
outside formal consultations.24
Media
The incentives of the media are defined by ratings, and by being able to make their programmes
sell. In the recent past, the electronic media in Pakistan has become a powerful actor, and is
considered a stakeholder in raising the profile of nutrition as an issue and for getting it on the
government’s agenda. Many of our respondents believe that issues get on the national political
agenda through the media, and that the government responds to issues that are in the news. The
media itself believes otherwise, in that the media simply highlights issues that are already big
on the political scene. As one media representative explained, “it is not news until a politician
speaks about it and makes it an issue. As soon as it is an issue, the media will pick up on it and
take it forward automatically”. In other words, social development issues become big not because
the media highlights them, but because a political constituency develops around them for other
reasons.
This is not to say that the media cannot play an effective role in highlighting the issue of nutrition
in the absence of political attention. Although programmes on social issues do not garner high
viewership and ratings, many media companies reserve a certain percentage of their programming
for airing segments on social issues. These are rarely used, though, because of an absence of
useful, well-researched, and accessible material. As one person connected to a media project
explained, “media houses need content and cash. If you are able to provide these, they will run
your material”.

24 This,

of course, applies far more to international staff members than to locally hired national staff.

39

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERNUTRITION NATIONAL REPORT: PAKISTAN

Nongovernmental organisations
The universalisation of the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme in India —
the government’s flagship programme on child undernutrition — was a major move forward in
the country’s history of nutrition interventions. Interestingly, the push for this came from within
civil society when the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) — a coalition of civil society
organisations — lodged a public interest litigation with the Supreme Court. The court issued an
order for universalisation that was implemented by the Ministry of Women and Child Development,
and the PUCL went on to build a large-scale movement around the issue, culminating eventually
in the Right to Food Campaign. Pakistan’s large number of NGOs, many of them focused on
social development issues, has yet to play any such role in bringing policy prominence to the
issue of nutrition. Most NGOs are supported by donor funding, and, by most accounts, this
defines their incentives.
In line with donor preferences, the NGO sector in Pakistan has focused on projects and programmes,
as opposed to political action and the development of a mass constituency around social
development issues. In an effort to meet donor targets and expectations, NGOs end up becoming
“subcontractors” rather than the initiators of a process of structural transformation (Ali 2005).
In fact, “a study of 40 civil society organisations in Pakistan highlights the destructive impact
foreign funding has on membership, with organisations reliant on development aid destroying
the evolution of cooperative behaviour and vastly reducing an organisation’s ability to attract
members” (Bano [2008] in Banks & Hulme 2012). A more political role for NGOs has also
traditionally been discouraged by Pakistan’s military regimes, which were happy to let them
operate as long as they were delivering social projects (Banks & Hulme 2012). In this area, NGOs
have done well, but their impact has been extremely limited.
Private sector
The incentives of the private sector, like the media, are quite obviously defined by profit and
sales, but as the example of salt fortification shows in Pakistan, this sector may hold the key to
success for some nutrition-related interventions. The sector’s special strength may indeed lie in
its distribution channels, in the fact that most companies have retail reach into the remotest parts
of the country, which is key for a number of purposes: for the distribution of fortified food and
clean drinking water, for monitoring trends and patterns, and for advocacy through the media
and ad campaigns. As long as the incentives of the nutrition sector can be aligned with those of
the profit-oriented private sector, the gains can be large. Some policy analysts strongly believe
that the role for the private sector, in particular the food industry, is indeed a large one within
the nutrition sector, especially as part of public-private partnerships, and as publicly registered
service-delivery bodies.

2.2 Vertical Integration and Monitoring
The preceding sub-section shows that there is growing horizontal coordination between the
government and donor groups, and even between line ministries within the provinces. Both
national and provincial strategies are also being developed. What remains missing from the
agenda, however, is the capacity of both national and provincial actors to actually deliver on
these strategies and mutually defined goals. The framework of our analysis defines vertical
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integration as exactly this issue — the extent to which capacity exists within the state to implement
policy across all tiers of government, and the extent to which stakeholders remain accountable
to one another. There are two particular areas of concern regarding vertical integration of nutrition
interventions in Pakistan: (a) the capacity of provincial departmental staff to deliver on the scale
and consistency required to reduce undernutrition; and (b) the weak network of sub-provincial
frontline staff available to implement interventions.
2.2.1 Capacity to Deliver
In order to move forward from horizontal coordination between different stakeholders to actual
implementation, government departments need commitment and capacity to deliver. By most
accounts, this is very weak across all tiers of government in Pakistan. As explained earlier,
devolution of power and a large range of ministries happened at great speed in 2010, without
allowing provinces the time to build the requisite capacity to take on additional functions. At the
time of devolution, delivery mechanisms across the provinces matched the circumscribed role
and functions that they traditionally had to deal with, and, even within these, they were being
described as inefficient and falling far short of their prescribed roles (Easterly 2003). Some of
our respondents argued that the situation may now actually worsen since additional functions
(resulting from the 18th Amendment) and resources (after the NFC 2009) have been passed on
without first changing the bureaucratic and service-delivery structure within which the provinces
operate. As one respondent put it, “the administrative structure is still trying to catch up with
devolution”.
Capacity is an issue, both in terms of the number of staff available within provincial departments
to deal with nutrition, as well as in terms of the staff’s understanding of undernutrition. One
official from a provincial department pointed out that whilst his office had enough work to occupy
three to four fulltime, nutrition-focused staff members, he was the only person in the provincial
government with responsibility for nutrition. He further pointed out that whilst more staff had
repeatedly been requested, the government has not yet prioritised building its capacity to deliver
on nutrition.25 Connected to this is the concern that even if staff positions were to be increased,
“expertise on nutrition is at a premium in Pakistan”.26 According to one respondent from a donor
agency, this affects not just government departments but also the capacity of donors to take their
programmes to scale across entire provinces, and NGOs in their ability to implement large
projects. In other words, whilst funds are available to deal with undernutrition in Pakistan,
absorption capacity to use these funds effectively is lacking across different actors, and this
shortcoming is most evident in provincial governments’ ability to plan, design, and implement
large nutrition programmes. According to one government official, donors have contributed to
this lack of departmental capacity by insisting on PBAs (such as Programme Management Units
for various sectoral programmes in Punjab and Sindh), which have led to a lack of capacity
development in line departments, as well as duplication and confusion.

25 Conversation
26 Interview

during Inception Meeting, June 2012, Islamabad.
with respondent from donor agency, Islamabad, Oct 2012.
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The Pakistani bureaucracy’s limited capacity to deliver social services predates devolution, and
has been recorded by various sources (Easterly 2003, ICG 2010). Various factors contribute to
this. The first of these is the structure of the civil service. “Archaic rules and procedures and a
rigid hierarchical authority structure have undermined its oversight of a public sector that has
expanded considerably since the 1970s. Low salaries, insecure tenure, and obsolete accountability
mechanisms have spawned widespread corruption and impunity” (ICG 2010). The hierarchical
structure of the bureaucracy means that lower-ranking officials rarely take initiative, unless
ordered to by higher-tier offices. This seemed to be the consensus within a group of government
officials at a recent meeting:27 for them to act to reduce undernutrition, orders to that effect would
have to come from Chief Secretaries or from executive political offices.28 A respondent from a
donor agency added, “We have a lot more capacity than we are presently using in Pakistan, but
we get no requests to deliver more. Provincial staff rarely take initiative.
Insecure tenure within the current structure means that bureaucrats are rarely invested in longterm programmes, since “they do not have the career structure to see a PC-1 through. The average
turnover of a Secretary is only around seven months”, explained a respondent from a research
institution. Another respondent from a donor agency pointed out, “each time a Secretary changes,
I have to go and brief them on our work, express an interest in working together, and then wait
to hear from them, and then they change again. They are lucky to be in their chair for a year.
Why would they be interested in any long-term policy?”
The second factor contributing to Pakistan’s limited capacity to deliver social services is that the
civil service is also deeply politicised, which means that “recruitments, postings and promotions
are increasingly made on the basis of personal contacts and political affiliation, instead of on
merit”, or based on expertise on a particular issue (ICG 2010). As a respondent from a donor
agency put it, “in one province even teachers have political backing, and you can’t make them
turn up even for trainings on time. They are immune to any kind of pressure to perform”. Part
of the explanation for the Indian state of Orissa’s recent impressive reduction of undernutrition
rates is indeed the fact that state officials with an academic or practical background in nutrition
were appointed to a number of key bureaucratic posts within relevant ministries (Mohmand
2012). In fact, Paul et al. (2011) point out that a lack of this at the national level in India, and
in other states, is a key reason for weak governance in the area of nutrition.
2.2.2 Capacity at the Frontline
In terms of capacity at the frontline, most respondents highlighted that fixing the delivery system
is key to reducing undernutrition. This refers to the staff on the frontlines, below the province
in the districts, tehsils, and unions of the country, that actually deal with implementation and
have direct contact with households — referred to by some respondents as the “community
component” of nutrition interventions.

27 Inception

Meeting, June 2012, Islamabad.

28 Some

respondents also argued that this was a reason for why nutrition could not be placed within any
particular line ministry if multi-sectorality is to be achieved. For all ministries to agree to coordinate their
work and alter their priorities, the directive to do so needs to come from a higher level, and not from just
another line ministry of equal status.

42

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERNUTRITION NATIONAL REPORT: PAKISTAN

However, the network of frontline staff in Pakistan is weak in general and almost nonexistent when it comes to nutrition in particular. When the MoH established a Nutrition
Wing in 2002 with the responsibility of implementing and monitoring health-related
nutrition activities, the wing itself had no direct role or presence in the districts for the actual
implementation of these activities. This, according to many, is the crucial missing link in
any effort to reduce rates of undernutrition, because greater coordination at the federal and
provincial levels will effect little real change in the absence of effective delivery systems
at the district level and below.
India’s recent reduction of its undernutrition rates is attributed in large part to the
universalisation of its flagship programme for dealing with child undernutrition — the
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme — which falls under the Ministry
of Women and Child Development, and through which community centres, called
Anganwadi centres 29 (AWCs), are established in villages and neighbourhoods across the
country. Each AWC covers about 1,000 people and is served by an Anganwadi Worker
(AWW), who works closely within the village with the Accredited Social Health Activist
(ASHA) and Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), both of which are frontline staff of the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. There are now over 1.2 million AWCs that cover
about 81 per cent of under-six children in India. In Orissa, a state that has had great success
with undernutrition reduction, the work of these two ministries is also coordinated and
regularly monitored through committees at the district, block, and sector levels.30
Both district-level coordination and an effective network of frontline staff are missing in Pakistan.
The administrative structure within districts is led by the DCO, under whom various EDOs each
lead 10–13 line departments.31 These EDOs work largely on their own connected vertically up
to DCOs and provincial departments but not horizontally, across to one another, leading to
fragmented service delivery in the districts. The only coordinating structure between them is
the office of the DCO — a single-person office that brings together the entire administrative
machinery of the province across all sectors. In order for various line ministries to coordinate
their work on nutrition in practise, it is important that EDOs be able to coordinate their work at
the district level. However, the DCO’s office is already overburdened by a multitude of
functions, and it is not surprising that it has not taken on the additional role of coordinating
across departments on nutrition. Instead, a dedicated nutrition unit that brings together EDOs
from different departments at the district level is required (see Section 9). There are some
exceptions to this, such as the ‘School Health and Nutrition Programme’ in Punjab, on
which there is collaboration between the EDOs of the health and education departments.
Respondents pointed out that the nutrition component of this is still very weak, but cases
do get referred through schools to BHUs, which are run by the provincial departments of
health in each union of the country, and for which primary responsibility was devolved to
EDOs-Health in the districts by LGO 2001.

29 Community

centres that are the main vehicle of the ICDS.
rough equivalent of tehsils and unions in Pakistan.
31 Depending on the particular Local Government Ordinance (LGO) of each province.
30 The
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Below the district, the tehsil is managed and coordinated by the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO),
with only one Tehsil Officer (TO) responsible for all infrastructure and services.32 Furthermore,
there is no formal administrative or financial link between the district and tehsil governments.
They work in parallel but on different subjects, so whilst water and sanitation, solid waste,
municipal infrastructure, and town planning are the responsibility of the tehsil, the district deals
with health, education, agriculture, community development, and finance and planning. So, for
example, within the health department, District Health Officers (DHOs) have responsibility for
tehsils, but they do not work with the tehsil government, and instead report to the EDO-Health
at the district level. In fact, DHOs are also based within district offices, so that all the work of
certain sectors ends up being concentrated and centralised in the EDOs at the district level, and
the lower tiers end up having few frontline government officials from the line ministries. The
district and tehsil tiers of government are also separately financed through the Provincial Finance
Commission (PFC) awards.
Within neighbourhoods and villages, the only frontline staff responsible for nutrition are the
LHWs, who “are essentially the nexus around whom all primary health care initiatives converge
for service delivery to the community. Therefore, in addition to their stipulated tasks, an important
role of the LHWs is to serve as a conduit for implementation of almost all national and international
community health initiatives” (LHW website, quoted in Khan 2011). The LHW programme used
to be a vertical programme managed at the federal level as the National Programme of Family
Planning and Primary Health Care, but has now been integrated into the provincial departments
of health. This process of integration has fared far better in Punjab and KPK than in Sindh and
Baluchistan. LHWs are placed within BHUs, with 10 to 20 LHWs per BHU, and each LHW
serves a population of about 1,000 people. Their work is monitored by LHW supervisors, of
which there is one to every ten LHWs, and they are provided with a vehicle and driver to transport
them around their designated area. There are currently about 100,000 LHWs, and they cover
about 60 per cent of the population (Khan 2011, Hafeez et al. 2011). After years of being
considered volunteers that were paid a stipend, LHWs recently advocated for and gained recognition
as regularised government employees with salaries.33
LHWs monitor their designated households through monthly visits, and they maintain diaries.
Their own house is designated a “health house,” and this is expected to be accessible to all those
that might require attention. They carry out 20 different tasks dealing with different aspects of
maternal and child-care, and they are equipped with small medicine boxes to help against common
ailments. A recent study found that areas with LHWs have significantly better health indicators
than the national average (Hafeez et al. 2011). However, LHWs are not equipped to weigh or
measure children, so they are unable to monitor undernutrition. In some areas, equipment has
now been procured through donor support. Some of our respondents also pointed out that LHWs
are underpaid and overburdened as the only field presence of a number of health initiatives,
including the Extended Programme on Immunisation (EPI), that goes beyond their original
stipulated functions.

32

Three other TOs head the departments of Regulation, Finance and Planning. (From “Devolution in Pakistan: Annex
1—Recent History”, Mimeo, Asian Development Bank, Department for International Development and World Bank;
2005).
33 The regularised service structure stipulates Grade 7 for supervisors, Grade 5 for LHWs, and Grade 4 for drivers.
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The reason for the increasing workload of the LHW is obvious enough. They are valuable frontline
workers in a weak service-delivery system that has few other such workers with direct, regular
contact with households. There is a great need for provinces to now move towards expanding
and improving their ability to deliver at the frontline, and, as one scholar put it, “the state must
develop its capacity at the local level beyond the patwari (local revenue officer), teacher and
thanedar (local police officer)”. The network at the local level is also removed from the process
of planning, and is involved only in the implementation process. The experience of Brazil in
reducing its rates of malnutrition showed that implementation improved considerably when subnational units of governance were involved in planning because it helped build ownership for
programmes well before the implementation stage. In Pakistan’s case, respondents from research
institutions pointed out that provinces should work closely with districts to strengthen their
capacity to deliver more effectively at the village level in the areas of basic and preventive health
care, water supply and sanitation, primary and secondary education, and irrigation, with greater
responsibility being passed down to the district eventually in all these areas.
However, for that to happen, the network and capacity of staff at this level will first have to be
strengthened. According to respondents from donor agencies, they are now increasingly aware
of the need for this and building local capacity is now on the agenda of some donors. In Sindh,
donors are implementing a Community Nutrition Volunteer (CNV) programme, whilst in the
other provinces; a greater budget is being allocated to strengthen the link between the community
and BHUs.
2.2.3 Monitoring and Data Collection
Closely connected to issues of capacity-building is the issue of regular monitoring and data
collection. According to Mejia Acosta & Fanzo (2011), “developing accurate and timely hunger,
vulnerability and nutrition information is the cornerstone of a broad-based nutrition strategy for
nations. Yet, obtaining an accurate picture of the scale of the nutrition problem has been a
challenge for many countries. Data collection on core nutrition indicators is often not timely,
with large surveys such as DHS or MICS occurring every few years”.
Regular data collection can contribute in four distinct ways to developing an effective nutrition
strategy in Pakistan. First, and most obviously, it is required to provide an exact picture of the
actual prevalence of undernutrition within villages and neighbourhoods across the country. The
NNS has done this effectively, and the 2011 NNS was, in fact, one of the triggers that changed
the nutrition landscape in Pakistan by bringing unprecedented attention to the issue. It is also
considered the most credible data currently available on undernutrition. However, the time gap
between the most recent survey, conducted in 2011, and the previous one in 2001 is too great.
Thus, whilst the NNS is able to provide a detailed picture of progress, or the lack thereof, on
nutrition indicators, it does not meet the requirements of more regular monitoring of the prevalence
of undernutrition.
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The NNS is complemented by the recently introduced District Health Information System (DHIS)
and through data collection by LHWs. However, there are a number of issues with these. The
DHIS has very few nutrition indicators right now, but this is changing. In Punjab, in particular,
it is being expanded in order to close the gaps that currently exist in information collection.
LHWs maintain data on more nutrition indicators, but they do not always have the necessary
equipment for measurements, and this data is thus not considered credible by all stakeholders.
Furthermore, DHIS and LHW data collection processes and databases are not integrated and
function as two entirely separate data systems. There are also other systems of data collection
across the various agencies that are equally separated from one another, details of which are
contained in the provincial reports. An integrated Nutrition Information System is required that
brings together indicators collected from all the relevant sectors — education, health, sanitation,
agriculture, and food — within the same database on a regular basis.
Second, credible, integrated and detailed data collected at more regular intervals is also important
for the development of a disaggregated understanding of the magnitude of undernutrition in
different population groups across the country. This will ensure that interventions can be tailored
to the needs of specific target population groups, that they can be designed according to the
specific socio-political context and delivery challenges of particular parts of the country, and that
their impact can be traced. Many of our respondents from both government and donor agencies
pointed out that bureaucrats and donor agency staff are equally unaware of the ground scenario
and that within state institutions, vertical linkages up and down the delivery chain are based on
formalistic linkages rather than on results-based frameworks with full monitoring systems. Given
this, much of the planning for nutrition interventions happens without concrete disaggregated
information. In order to be able to set clear and precise targets, coverage, and timelines for
interventions — as the provincial strategies that are currently under development in each province
are attempting to define — disaggregated regular data collection is required. Respondents at the
federal level were concerned that the lack of regular data may affect these strategies. The NNS
enables some degree of disaggregation, but this is limited since it is a survey and not a census.
A major recent step forward is the data that is now available on household-level poverty through
the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). It does not include nutrition indicators, but it
has provided a database at the household level that can now be supplemented with further
information.
Third, from a political economy perspective, timely and reliable data collection is also a way to
incentivise political and administrative action around nutrition interventions. On the political
front, as explained in Section 6.3, politicians have few incentives to work on an issue that requires
long-term efforts to achieve slow, incremental gains that are rarely obvious. If, however, regular
monitoring of nutrition interventions can show progress and provide evidence of achievements
that can be linked to the terms in office of political actors, they may be more willing to put
nutrition on their agendas. On the administrative front, public officials can be incentivised to
invest more time and energy in nutrition interventions if special funds can be tied — either in
the PFC or through donor programmes — to the data-based evidence of higher undernutrition
burdens in certain districts. Regularly monitored progress and impact on this front can then be
linked to special awards or special mentions within government gazettes or other fora.
Finally, regularly well-publicised data on the progress of interventions, for instance as an annual
index, can contribute to making nutrition a regular part of the development discourse and narrative
in the country. Respondents in Islamabad pointed out that despite all the research into the issue
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in recent years, the numbers, images, and impact of undernutrition are still missing from the
public discourse. Each report and presentation reproduces similar tables and graphs on prevalence,
but few have attempted to convey to policymakers what this means in reality, what is required
to reduce this in actual number terms, and how impact can be measured and attributed on a regular
basis. In other words, monitoring in and of itself is a large part of the challenge of greater policy
attention, multi-sectoral, coordination and vertical integration of nutrition interventions.

2.3 Funding
According to the nutrition governance framework, adequate funding is the third critical pillar
for successful interventions against undernutrition. Funding is also the cement that holds together
the other two dimensions: it provides “the incentives (or deterrents) for inter-sectoral cooperation,
and it facilitates (or obstructs)” the vertical coordination of policy interventions across different
tiers of government (Mejia Acosta & Fanzo 2012). In Pakistan, adequate funding for nutrition
interventions is less of an issue compared to the other dimensions of nutrition governance discussed
above. Donors have committed large sums to the fight against undernutrition, and at the same
time, the largest ever NFC award in the country’s history has also ensured that provinces have
more money available to take on the added functions that have been devolved to them. Provinces
also have the ability to raise donor funds directly, so that their fiscal base to deal with social
development issues has expanded considerably in the last few years. The key challenge lies in
the lack of effective coordination mechanisms that would facilitate sector and donor coordination
(thus avoiding duplication), encourage effective spending at the provincial and district levels,
and allow transparent monitoring of funds.
To date, much of the funding for nutrition interventions has come from donors, and much of this
has gone directly through programme-based modalities to the provinces. Whilst there is talk of
an MDTF and pooled funding, and there is an effort to coordinate the support to nutrition
interventions, donor funds are still allocated separately and through different modalities. The
donor group on nutrition is led by the World Bank, which has no provincial presence but works
with each province under different arrangements. Based on the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF’s) critical macro-economic evaluations, the World Bank has discontinued budgetary support
and now provides funds only through sector support in the provinces. This works differently in
each province. Since International Development Association (IDA) terms for Pakistan have
become harder in recent years, KPK and Baluchistan have withdrawn from the modality and
prefer grants instead, many of which have come from AusAID, whilst Sindh has borrowed $55
million for nutrition specifically, and matched it with ten per cent provincial funds. Punjab refused
vertical projects and asked instead for a sectoral support programme through the finance ministry.34
UNICEF has a large presence in all four provinces and three regions of Pakistan through direct
nutrition interventions and is also leading the way on developing inter-sectoral responses and
strategies on nutrition. DFID, AusAID, WFP, WHO, FAO, and the European Union (EU) also
have various separate projects across the country, with some more focused on certain provinces
than others, and ranging in their activities from flood-focused interventions to working directly
with provincial departments and federal ministries.

34 Interview

with respondent from donor agency, Islamabad, Oct 2012.
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The preponderance of donor funding has led to concerns regarding the extent of state ownership
of the growing number of nutrition initiatives. Some respondents argued that line ministries are
entering into various agreements with donor agencies simply as a response to the availability of
money, and not because they have greater ownership of the issue now. In fact, the lack of state
ownership over nutrition, referred to repeatedly by various respondents, poses a serious challenge
of sustainability to the current initiatives 35 and forms a central concern of the funding partners.
For the donors, this provides the rationale for moving ahead with directly funded nutrition
programmes in the provinces. The problem is also recognised by government officials themselves,
one of whom pointed out, “nutrition is not asking for a huge investment, just a reprioritisation,
[multi-sectoral] interaction and integration, but this is missing”. Another government official
underlined this point by providing the example of unavailed government funds for nutrition.
According to this official, a Rs. ten-million block allocation was made for nutrition in the
2005–2010 Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF)36 but remained unused because it
was not requested by any department. This was despite reminders of the allocation being sent
out by the PC to various line ministries. According to the official, “the problem is that nutrition
is not prioritised by anyone”.
The state has also not consolidated all the different funding modalities for nutrition under a single
budgetary framework that captures all government and donor resources and connects them to
the achievement of a defined strategy. Rather, funds have remained project-specific and managed
under multiple agreements. This is despite the fact that, in principle, all donor funds are supposed
to be coordinated by the EAD. However, in the absence of a national strategy that can define the
target and purpose of funds, as well as a tracking and monitoring mechanism for the impact of
implemented projects, the EAD is reduced to simply approving and passing projects between the
provinces, the PC, and the donors. Some government officials, however, expressed an interest
in moving beyond donor-funded projects for nutrition to fund-sharing agreements for nutrition
work. According to them, the project-based approach that lies outside the regular funding and
budget cycles is unsustainable, and is in itself an explanation for the lack of state ownership.
Instead, they argued for a matching grants system — the contribution by government of a share
of nutrition financing — in order to incentivise the government’s ownership of nutrition and to
move away from a complete dependence on donor funds.
Federal-level actors also argued for regulatory functions to remain at the federal level, and pointed
out that whilst actors in Islamabad are careful about treading on provincial toes now, and that
very little can now be initiated at the centre, there is still a need for strategy to be centrally
defined. Furthermore, their concern was that provincial line departments might need to be
incentivised to work on nutrition, and that this could be done most effectively through a central
coordinating body such as the Nutrition Council, and through matching funds schemes from the
PC. This is in line with the federal model used in India, where nutrition continues to be dealt
with through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) initiated in Delhi. So far, the actual division
between the federal and provincial levels in terms of funding is still not entirely clear, given that

35

The provincial reports make reference to the fact that many donor-funded projects within state departments end
when donor funding ends.
36 MTDFs replaced Pakistan’s FiveYear Plans, which were used until 1999 to define the economic and development targets of the government.
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about Rs. seven billion of health-sector funding for vertical programmes has been retained at the
centre under a decision of the Council of Common Interests. This decision states that the federal
government will continue funding vertical health and population welfare programmes through
the period of the 7th NFC award till 2014–2015, and that until that time, each province will simply
receive a share of the federal allocation for these programmes (PILDAT 2012).
Within provinces, recent health-sector reforms have introduced the idea of results and performancebased budgeting, but the transfer of funds to the districts for implementation has remained an
issue. Whilst the NFC has been heavily debated and reformed, the PFC awards have received
little attention, and great disparities remain in fiscal distribution at the sub-provincial level. Recent
research indicates that expenditures are carried out largely within provincial headquarters whilst
a number of districts are not able to get their legitimate share (Mustafa 2011). Furthermore, the
lack of an elected district-level tier of government has also meant that district administrations
are being squeezed of development funding in the absence of political actors to negotiate funds
for that level.
Table 2: Formula for the distribution of funds to districts through the PFC awards
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3

PROVINCIAL COMPARISIONS
3.1 Nutrition Situation in Provinces
In all provinces, undernutrition is a chronic, long-standing issue, as seen by high levels of stunting
and with little evidence of decrease (and in some cases, a deterioration), over the past decade.
Undernutrition levels are highest in Baluchistan, closely followed by Sindh, then KPK, with the
lowest levels in Punjab (Table 3). However, even in Punjab, one-third of children under five
years are underweight, revealing an unacceptably high level of undernutrition.
All four provinces have high levels of sub-clinical deficiencies, with anaemia and Vitamin A
having the highest prevalence levels amongst children under five. Anaemia and Vitamin-D
deficiency dominate amongst mothers. However, there are variations in terms of relative severity
across provinces. Vitamin-A deficiency is highest in Baluchistan and KPK, whilst anaemia and
Vitamin-D deficiency is highest in Sindh and Punjab.

Table 3: Undernutrition status by provinces

Biomarker used: *Serum Retinol levels, **Serum Vitamin-D levels ***Serum Zinc levels

Source: NNS 2011.

3.2 Contextual Resources and Constraints in the Provinces
Undernutrition in Pakistan is compounded in almost all provinces by poverty, patriarchy, steep inflation in
food prices, and insufficient availability of safe water, proper sanitation, and preventive health services for
mother and child. Challenges are most formidable in Baluchistan, lesser in Sindh and KPK, and least in
Punjab.
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3.2.1 Food Security Resources
Food security is one of the contributors of undernutrition; however, addressing food security
alone, as seen from the experience of many countries, is not enough to improve undernutrition.
The Rome declaration on World Food Security in 1996 defined food security as a situation where
“All people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious foods
to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active healthy life.” Overall, 58 per cent
of Pakistan is food-insecure; the percentage of food-insecure population is highest in Sindh at
a staggering 72 per cent, followed by Baluchistan at 64 per cent, with lesser levels in Punjab (60
per cent) and KPK (32 per cent). Food security in Pakistan is inter-dependent on local food
production, the extent to which local farmers own the land and the produce grown, food inflation,
and consumption of food by women and children.
Agriculture, although a key sector of the national economy (one-fifth of the net GDP), has been
experiencing stagnation. Punjab is the main food-producing province, followed by Sindh; however,
surplus food-producing districts in Punjab have decreased from 21 to 14, and, in Sindh, from 11
to 6 (SDPI, 2009). Agriculture is a minor economic activity in KPK and has only a patchy
presence in Baluchistan (confined to a few districts); however, similarly, in these provinces, there
has been no improvement in agriculture. More importantly, even in areas where agriculture is
vibrant, its benefits will not be translated into nutrition unless emphasis is given to what is grown
and its capture by the local population. Emphasis within agriculture in all provinces remains on
cash crops, which have higher income gains than kitchen farming. Although kitchen farming has
lower income gains, it directly benefits food-insecure households. Agriculture policies have
tended to be dominated by economists with agriculture interpreted in terms of economic growth
and GDP contribution rather than adoption of a development vision focusing on equitable
distribution of benefits. This has resulted in cash crop policies and the state focusing on wheat
rather than crop diversification and political, economic, and technical support to small farmers
for land cultivation and crop diversification.
Power structures are of critical importance in terms of who owns the farming land and in deciding
what is grown and the capture by the local households. There is highly inequitable ownership
of land, with only 44 per cent of the rural population in Pakistan owning land and the majority
being landless, dependent for work, food, and shelter on large landholders, and often trapped
into cycles of debt and poverty. With predominance of large landholdings, there tends to be
cultivation of economically productive cash crops of direct cash benefit to landholders rather
than kitchen gardening and small livestock of nutritional benefit to the local populace. Moreover,
the Haris working the farms have no rights over the food grown, leading to little capture of
agriculture into food consumption. Poverty is highest in populations lacking land ownership and
drops by at least ten percentage points with ownership of land (PIDE 2001). Landlessness is
highest in Sindh followed by Baluchistan.
Whilst Punjab has the lowest absolute figure of landlessness, there are high pockets in Southern
Punjab. In contrast, KPK has more equitable distribution of land, with most comprising of small
landholdings. Although at the time of Independence in 1947, both Pakistan and India were
confronted with large landholdings owned by the elite, socialist reformist policies of the Indian
National Congress, and, in particular, the left-wing governments of Kerala and West Bengal led
to sweeping abolishment of large holdings (Besley 2000). Whilst in Pakistan, large landholders
have been part of the ruling elite, both in elected governments and military-sponsored democracies,
with land reforms hence never having a constituency of support.
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Food security has also been affected by steep inflation during 2008–2012, affecting even essential
food commodities (Figure 5). The amount spent on food is 53.86 per cent of income (SPDC
2004), which is comparatively much higher than 30 per cent spending on food in India
(Banerjee & Duflo 2007) and 10 per cent in the developed economy of the USA (USDA
2005). Nationally, the poorest households spend around 58.75 per cent of their income on food,
compared to 39.5 per cent, showing regressive impact of inflation. With stretched food budgets,
the poor are unable to absorb the effects of increases, leading to a diet with less nutritious foods
or foregoing of meals.
Figure 5: Food inflation

Source: Pakistan Economic Surveys, FBS.

3.2.2 Poverty Challenges
Development policy in Pakistan has traditionally focused on economic growth with high GDP
growth rates assumed to alleviate poverty level. Trickle down of economic productivity to the
poor has remained questionable, even in periods of high economic growth seen during the 1950s
and 1960s, whilst economic recession since the 1980s (Figure 6) has further compounded poverty.
Of the population in Pakistan, 31 per cent level is below the poverty line (UNDP 2011). Baluchistan
has the highest percentage of population living below the poverty line (48 per cent) followed by
Sindh (31 per cent), and poverty concentration is in both rural areas and small towns. Both Punjab
and KPK have lower poverty levels, and, unlike Baluchistan and Sindh, poverty is concentrated
in small towns with much less in rural areas, and may be related to more equitable land holdings.
There is conclusive evidence that food insecurity and low health care coverage is directly related
to poverty in all the provinces of Pakistan, as detailed in the provincial reports. Hence poverty
is an important mediator of nutrition resources across all provinces.
At the same time, it is GDP growth rather than poverty that has dominated the policy attention
of successive civilian and military governments — poverty has been less of an agenda. Visible
attention has mainly come from the PPP which has an electorate base in the rural poor. BISP,
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started by the PPP government in 2008–2009, is the first social protection programme in Pakistan
providing cash transfers to poor female beneficiaries in rural areas of all four provinces. It provides
an important opportunity for links with nutrition.
Figure 6: GDP trends in Pakistan

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey

Table 4: Food security resources and poverty in Pakistani provinces, 2009 – 2011

*

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Sources: NNS 2011,¹ FBS 2009–2010,² SPDC 2011.³

3.2.3 Caregiver Resources
Females, as caregivers of the children and family, and themselves as mothers, play a key role
in nutrition. As discussed in the first section of the report, there is pervasive patriarchy across
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all provinces; there is a somewhat better picture in central and upper Punjab but weaker gender
resources in Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh. Maternal education is an important covariate of
undernutrition, as there is evidence that severe and moderate stunting rates fall drastically when
the mother’s education is above matriculation level (NNS 2011). The literacy rate (see Table 5)
is lower in females compared to males in all the provinces of Pakistan; the lowest level is in
Baluchistan (19 per cent), followed by KPK (33 per cent) and Sindh (46 per cent), with the
highest in Punjab (50.7 per cent). This gap is further widened in the rural population and is also
reflected in sub-provincial differentials. Economic autonomy amongst women is also weak, as
unemployment rates in qualified females seeking a job are higher as compared to males in all
provinces, with the widest gap seen in KPK. Similarly, less than 50 per cent of women are allowed
to work for their livelihood in the three smaller provinces, with marginally higher rates in Punjab.
Decision-making power within all households belongs to males, with roles of others agents such
as tribal elders or religious leaders seen in KPK, Baluchistan, and Sindh.
Table 5: Caregiver resources

Source: Literacy: (PSLM 2010–2011); Employment: Labour Force Survey 2010–2011; Gender: USAID 2012.

3.2.4 Healthy Environment & Health Services
Policy attention in Pakistan has generally focused on irrigation rather than public health engineering
(PHE), which deals with drinking water and sanitation. Safe water and sanitation are key
contributors to undernutrition, helping prevent a chronic cycle of illness leading to undernutrition,
with young children being particularly susceptible. Punjab has comparatively high levels of safe
water usage by households (94 per cent), whilst safe water consumption levels drop sharply in
Baluchistan (46 per cent) (see Table 6). Sanitation, however, is a more problematic issue across
all provinces. The use of hygienic sanitation facilities in Pakistan is confined to only 66 per cent
of the population, with Baluchistan and KPK being the worst-affected provinces. Baluchistan
in general faces the most severe and long-standing issue of water scarcity, affecting all three
areas pertinent to nutrition (i.e., crop production, drinking, and sanitation).
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Table 6: Healthy environment & health services

Sources: PSLM 2010–2011,¹ Pakistan Demographic Health Survey (PDHS) 2006–2007.²

Key health services—such as immunisation levels, pregnancy care visits, proper breastfeeding,
and supplementation of Vitamin A to children and iron/folate to pregnant women—are essential
to prevent undernutrition in mothers and children, the group most at risk. Coverage of health
interventions is sub-optimal across all provinces, with inequitable coverage of geographical
regions and income groups. Punjab has relatively better rates than other provinces (see Table 3)
followed by Sindh; however, the figures for Sindh mark large disparities across urban and rural
areas, with coverage rates for disadvantaged districts matching those of Baluchistan, which has
the least coverage. Baluchistan and focal districts of KPK and Sindh also face significant challenges
of outreach due to dispersed population over remote areas. Population density of Baluchistan is
only 19 persons/sq. km over the largest and difficult terrain in Pakistan. Conversely, Punjab has
more compact population distribution, with 338 persons/sq. km spread over plains well-connected
with a network of roads.
3.2.5 Vulnerability to Disasters
Risk of undernutrition is compounded by natural disasters through displacement, disease, and
crop destruction. Natural disasters have recently been on the increase, with flash floods seen in
all provinces in 2010 and 2011 (see Table 7). These have caused extensive destruction in Sindh,
areas of KPK, Southern Punjab, and extensive areas across Baluchistan. Baluchistan is particularly
vulnerable to environmental threats which have included drought, earthquakes, and floods in
different ecological zones of the province.
Table 7: Vulnerability to disasters

Source: PDMA.
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3.2.6 Summary of Contextual Challenges for Nutrition
In sum, Baluchistan is the most fragile province to external context, facing high food insecurity,
chronic shortage of water, vulnerability to both drought and flooding, inadequate outreach of
social-sector services, and a patriarchal and tribal power structure. This is reflected in its very
high level of undernutrition. Sindh, despite being the second-most food-producing province,
faces considerable undernutrition and the highest level of food insecurity. This is due to greatest
land inequities amongst all provinces compounded by poverty, patriarchy, poor delivery of the
social sector, and recent flash floods. In KPK, the social exclusion of women and high levels of
conflict are the largest issues, but it is not food-insecure — based on a more equitable distribution
of land and greater crop diversification — and has lower levels of undernutrition than Sindh.
Punjab has surplus food production, lower poverty levels, and better access to water, sanitation,
and preventive health. However, in the Southern Punjab districts, inequitable land distribution,
greater poverty, and decreased access to social services are the main sources of undernutrition
and demand district-focused strategies.

3.3 Horizontal Coordination for Nutrition: Nutrition Profile, Construct,
and Stakeholders
It is important to understand the depth and nature of attention to nutrition in the pre-devolution
context, as this has important implications on nutrition action in the provinces.
3.3.1 Low Policy Profile and Slow Process
Before the devolution of 2010, social-sector policy was strongly led by the federal level, with a
common set of tailored policies across all four provinces. Nutrition traditionally has been a low
priority at the federal level, and, consequently, across all four provinces. Nutrition was
institutionalised in the PC in 1973, but there was little subsequent movement. Its operationalisation
was slow, coming more than three decades later in 2005, and was confined to the health sector
with creation of a Nutrition Wing in the MoH. Even after operationalisation, nutrition remained
confined to small-scale initiatives in all provinces, comprising of certain preventive health
activities, salt iodisation and operational pilots for school feeding in girls’ schools. There was
low commitment of funding by the state, and funding was small-scale and mainly provided by
development partners; projects halted when funds dried up. Although one billion Pak Rupees
were allocated in the last Public-Sector Development Programmes (PSDP) for nutrition, this
allocation did not get utilised due to lack of state interest.
After four decades of nutrition institutionalisation, there is still a conspicuous absence of a
nutrition policy and strategy. A Micronutrient Strategic Plan in 2006 and a draft Pakistan Integrated
National Strategy in 2011were instigated and supported by development partners, but have lacked
state funding and operational plans. Low policy movement on nutrition has been due to several
overarching reasons.
First, inherent need for connectivity across sectors makes nutrition a complex subject. The relevant
sectors can neither deliver alone nor have the mandate to instigate and coordinate action on
nutrition, as discussed in further detail below. Second, nutrition as a silent, hidden issue has had
low visibility for the political and bureaucratic leadership. The very nature of nutrition does not
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offer quick, short-term wins, but instead relies on a cohesive development vision, which has not
been forthcoming as development priorities in Pakistan have been historically dominated by
economic growth and infrastructure-dominated projects. Third, within the ambit of nutrition,
state attention and policy has focused on food security rather than the wider issue of nutrition.
In Pakistan, there has been a strong role of economists — rather than social development scientists
—in the federal policymaking bureaucracy with a leaning towards the supply and demand aspects
of food security. Hence there has been a strong wheat policy implemented across all four provinces
involving wheat subsidy and distribution to ensure flour availability on the market at controlled
prices. However, with lack of specific targeting of poor and disadvantaged groups and a focus
narrowly confined to wheat, there is lack of translation into nutrition-related benefits.
Politicians have also tended to champion food security due to its visible, tangible, and immediate
benefits to the electorate. However, political support has been around more superficial gestures,
such as food-distribution schemes that have low viability and risk of partisan implementation
in respective constituencies. The ruling PPP, which noticeably has hunger in its slogan, instituted
the Food Security Task Force in 2008, followed by the Ministry of Food Security in 2012, and
a draft Zero Hunger National Plan for free food distribution to the poor across all provinces. In
Punjab, the provincial PML-N government has initiated schemes for hunger independently from
the federal food initiatives of the PPP government, involving the sasti roti, or cheap bread, and
sarkari kitchen, or state kitchen programmes. There has been distribution of food rations to flood
victims of the 2010 and 2011 floods through the PDMAs in all provinces without investment in
an exit strategy.
3.3.2 Construct of Nutrition in the Provinces
Nutrition, whilst remaining a low policy profile agenda with slapdash implementation, also
suffered from lack of a cohesive construct across all provinces. Nutrition was institutionalised
in 1973 in the PC of Pakistan as a subject with reliance on different sectors, as done in other
countries. Subsequent operationalisation was narrow, with nutrition delegated as a subset of
health activities. Interventions, although inadequately funded and having patchy coverage in all
provinces, predominantly involved preventive health measures whose focus kept changing over
time, showing a lack of nutrition vision, even within health.
Strategies included the establishment of Baby-Friendly Hospitals for promoting newborn
breastfeeding, nutrition corners at public-sector hospitals for nutrition-related advice, distribution
of Vitamin-A supplements to children as well as iron and folic acid supplements to pregnant
women, and the management of acute malnutrition in disaster- and conflict-affected populations.
Salt fortification was initiated in all four provinces with training, equipment, and commodities
support directed towards private food processors, but this also was operationalised and managed
by the health sector. There were small-scale attempts at nutrition advocacy, but they remained
confined to the paediatric community and health-related NGOs. Multi-sectoral action was
constructed as garnering support from other sectors for implementation of preventive health
interventions.
Understanding of nutrition remains weak across sectors in all provinces, with narrow linkage by
stakeholders to health, food, or poverty with visible disconnects in understanding across the
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sectors. There is relatively better recognition of nutrition as a cross-sectoral agenda in Baluchistan
as compared to other provinces, and this may be due to sensitivity of local stakeholders to the
challenging context that Baluchistan faces which demands contribution by all sectors.
3.3.3 Recent Profiling of Nutrition in the Provinces
Movement towards nutrition as a prominent policy agenda and having a wider cross-sectoral
construct is recent. A number of focusing events opened the window for nutrition policy dialogue.
The flash floods of 2010 and 2011 visibly highlighted mother and child undernutrition in affected
areas of all four provinces and instigated a coordinated cluster response. Around the same time,
the global Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) movement activated UNICEF support to formulate a draft
PINS at the federal level spearheaded by UNICEF and committed other development partners
to funding support for nutrition in Pakistan. The release of NNS in early 2012, backed with
unusual media publicity, further shot the undernutrition issue into policy prominence with a call
for action backed by researchers, media, and development partners. Lastly, the provincial
devolution of 2011 provided development partners an easier direct engagement process, with
provincial governments sidestepping the centralised and slower planning processes. As a result,
nutrition in the provinces has become a new public policy agenda spearheaded by development
partners with some technocratic support from researchers and experts.
In all provinces, Inter-Sectoral Nutrition Committees and Technical Working Groups have been
set up at the P&DD, with technical support and lobbying by UNICEF and World Bank. With
funding support for health by World Bank, bilateral and UN agencies have also been initiated
to support globally recommended cost-effective interventions. However, ownership and action
by provincial governments remain questionable.
3.3.4 Nutrition Stakeholders in the Provinces - Incentives and Disincentives for Mobilisation
There has been little horizontal coordination for nutrition in the past and hence there are few
actors meaningfully involved.
Bureaucracy
The government sectors in all four provinces have lacked policy targets and policy frameworks
to mainstream nutrition in sectoral policies. The administrative culture of vertical implementation
from federal to provincial level has also provided little incentive to come up with provincial
innovations in the wake of federal inertia on nutrition. Within the provincial departments, health
has traditionally been the most active, employing preventive health strategies targeted at women
and children, although activities have been small-scale, interrupted, and focus kept changing
over time. Provincial food departments have had negligible contribution to salt iodisation schemes,
which have been operationalised within the Health Department whilst market quality assurance
of fortified foods and pricing has overlapping and unclear roles between health and food. Similarly,
school-feeding pilots have been separately managed by the Education Department, but lack
connects with health for nutrition awareness and child preventive health interventions, and with
poverty-alleviation schemes such as BISP for targeting poor households. The Tawana Project,
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providing freshly prepared food and dietary education at girls’ schools and working through joint
funding lines, was the only multi-sectoral initiative involving Women’s Development, Bait-ulMal, and NGOs, but was discontinued two years into the programme (see Box 1). Although other
sectors such as agriculture, irrigation, PHE, and social protection indirectly impact nutrition, they
haven’t been drawn into the coalition of nutrition initiatives.
The Tawana Pakistan Programme, implemented from 2002–2005 across all four provinces, had a central
focus on nutrition, rather than school enrolment, through food distribution. It offered freshly prepared food
using local ingredients, mothers’ nutritional education, and development of parent-teacher organisations.
A home-grown initiative instigated by academics, it was championed by the Minister for Education, who
came from an apolitical technocratic background and was part of the Musharraf regime’s earlier induction
of moderates into the government. Tawana was initially housed in the Ministry of Education; however,
moving the Education Minister to the Women’s Development Ministry led to its housing in Women’s
Development. However, lack of presence of Women’s Development at the district level and lack of formal
involvement of Education and DCOs led to poor district ownership and turf-setting issues. Hence the project
was discontinued despite reduction in undernutrition in school girls (from 24 to 18 per cent) and increase
in mothers’ knowledge (from 4 to 35 per cent) (Badruddin 2008). All provinces showed a significant decrease
in underweight. The changes in wasting were significant at the national level; however, Sindh and Northern
areas did not experience a significant decrease in stunting (Badruddin 2008).

Politicians
For the politicians, nutrition has never been a priority agenda in any of the provinces. The case
for nutrition has never been presented to politicians and is not properly understood. Furthermore,
it is an ambitious and more challenging agenda and does not offer quick wins that can help
politicians get re-elected by their constituencies. Over the last five years, politicians have been
able to exert greater influence over allocation of development funds due to the earmarking of a
substantial portion of the PSDP for parliamentarian-initiated schemes. This has led to traction
toward infrastructure-dominated projects in local constituencies in all provinces, offering visibility
to the electorate and avenues for kickbacks in lucrative procurement. This has been most marked
in Baluchistan — with political priorities over-riding caution from the bureaucracy — and has
been a source of growing disenchantment between the bureaucracy and the parliamentarians.
Similarly, politicians, irrespective of party lines, have also supported local food-distribution and
cash-transfer schemes as an attempt to garner support for popular re-election. In KPK and Sindh,
it was felt that there are distinct opportunities that can be captured by working with the women’s
caucus in parliament, which has successfully championed social-sector causes across party lines
as well as by advocating young parliamentarians in search for social agendas.
CSOs
Even outside the state, coalitions around nutrition are narrow in all provinces. There is a
conspicuous lack of CSOs’ coalition and advocacy. There are disconnects between the health and
agriculture NGOs, with a common construct of nutrition yet to be developed to bring them
together. Moreover, for CSOs, nutrition is not a home-grown agenda, and CSO involvement is
limited to passive contractees of focal, donor-funded projects. Nutrition experts are few, and
belong mostly to health rather than other sectors, and there exists a dearth of programmes and
professorships in nutrition.
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Private commercial sector
This sector is also an important but untapped constituency. Private health providers, comprising
mostly of general practitioners, are comparatively better-utilised than government facilities (PDHS
2006), but lack regulation for provision of pro-nutrition measures and have an incentive systems
toward more lucrative, curative care services. The private food sector, involved in donor-supported
fortification projects, has so far failed to be incentivised for nutrition. Insufficient community
demand for fortified and quality food products, lack of market surveillance by state, and absence
of funding subsidy for purchase of fortification commodities serve as disincentives towards
investment in nutrition.
Non-state coalitions
Non-state coalitions have relatively been the most active in Sindh, where coalitions have also
visibly included nutrition experts, CSOs, and paediatricians serving in both the public and private
commercial sectors. Efforts of individual medical experts in Sindh have resulted in nutrition
initiatives in public-sector hospitals, but poor ownership by district governments and the provincial
Health Department has undermined sustainability. The philanthropic sector in Sindh is one of
the most active in the region, and philanthropic outfits focusing on hunger have rapidly grown
in urban Sindh in response to steep food inflation. In other provinces, international nongovernmental
organisations (INGOs), rather than local actors, have been involved in nutrition but confined to
project delivery over a specific tenure rather than advocacy and coalition building. This is due
to both a less-developed local non-state sector in other provinces, with the least developed sector
in Baluchistan, as well as lack of local champions for nutrition as seen in Punjab.
Media
In the last decade, the media has emerged as a strong stakeholder in the non-state sector in all
provinces, and remains a potential but untapped resource for nutrition. The technical nature of
nutrition results in weak understanding, whilst its chronic nature results in less coverage than
acute emergency events, such as Polio and Dengue outbreaks. Moreover, with dominance of
political thrillers and security threats in Pakistan, social issues get side-lined unless they reach
a crisis level. Provincial governments are also hampered with low skills for media management
and lack of credible and confident relationships with the media.
Donors
In Pakistan, international development partners historically involved with nutrition have been
the UN agencies such as UNICEF, WFP, FAO, and WHO, with a common engagement across
all provinces. They have provided support for commodities, awareness-building and monitoring,
and involving government and local counterpart NGOs; however, projects have been short-term
and lacked a coordinated strategy amongst donors. INGOs have also been active — notably MI,
the local counterpart of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), for food fortification
in all provinces — whilst other NGOs, such as Save the Children, Merlin, and IRC have had
focal presence in conflict and disaster areas of KPK and Baluchistan. Bilaterals and multilateral
agencies lacked sustentative roles until recently. The recent momentum towards nutrition has
involved the spearheading of technical support by UNICEF for inter-sectoral action in all four
provinces, supported with nutrition-specific funding to health by the World Bank across the four
provinces. Bilateral support varies across provinces and involves support for preventive health
activities.
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Figure 7: Nutrition Stakeholders in the Provinces

3.4 Horizontal Coordination: Leadership, Structural, and Coordination
Challenges
3.4.1 Executive Leadership for Nutrition
Executive leadership is needed in the provinces to mainstream nutrition across different sectors.
The current context provides a window of opportunity with increased fiscal space following the
7th NFC award and enhanced policy space following the 2010 devolution. The 2010 devolution,
although positively recognised by provinces, has generally been felt to be conducted in an abrupt
manner with little prior planning and phasing in. Provinces during 2011 and 2012 have been
embroiled in administrative and budgetary implications of devolution, and there has been less
time to sort out development priorities. In at least two of the provinces, Sindh and Baluchistan,
the pre-election year of 2012 has also been exceptionally busy in terms of building in PC-1 for
special projects patronised by parliamentarians for their respective constituencies. There is also
uneven capacity across provinces for charting their own vision. Further complicating the issue
of horizontal coordination at the provincial level is the fact that certain nutrition-relevant
programmes have been retained at the federal level, such as BISP, the National Disaster Management
Authority (NDMA) and the Ministry of Food Security. This means that the provinces have to
additionally coordinate with federal counterparts, requiring openness and capacity for wider
coordination.
In KPK, there has been a distinct move post-devolution to develop a provincial development
vision, and nutrition is to be coordinated within planning underway for different sectors. Punjab,
like KPK, has moved forward in defining its post-devolution vision, and, within nutrition, there
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has been positive support from the P&DD, with speedy movement on preparatory work. Executive
leadership in Sindh and Baluchistan has been weak, constrained by larger overarching issues.
These include a weak governance culture due to pervasive political appointments in bureaucracy,
conflict and security issues exerting traction away from development, and uneasy political
coalitions undermining a strong cohesive development vision and leading to juggling for resources.
3.4.2 Coordination Challenges – Lack of a Structural Home
Horizontal coordination across sectors for nutrition is challenging, as different provincial
departments have separate planning, budgeting, and monitoring leading to soiled working and
poor sharing of documents and strategies across departments. As Department Secretaries carry
the brunt of centralised work, they also have little time for cross-sectoral initiatives that fall
beyond their mandate, whilst there is absence of backup focal persons for nutrition in all key
sectors, except health. With health being the principal active sector for nutrition projects and
monitoring, other departments are less keen to buy in unless a central convening structure is
provided to ensure even footing for all sectors. As yet, there is no formal structure to house
nutrition in the provinces. P&DD are responsible for coordinating subjects across departments
towards a provincial development framework; however, despite the existence of a Nutrition Wing
in the National Planning Commission, counterpart Nutrition Wings have not yet been created in
any of the provincial P&DDs, nor has responsibility for nutrition been attributed to the different
units within P&DD that are responsible for coordination with different sectors. There is a popular
demand for a convening role of the P&DD within all four provinces. At the same time, provincial
departments prefer loose coordination, allowing sector-specific budgets and plans with low buyin for jointly funded initiatives, and are driven by turf issues of power and funds. At the P&DD,
there is similar reluctance towards joint centralised initiatives compounded by past experience
of collective failure in SAP due to centralised slow bureaucratic and funding releases.
The best momentum towards cross-sectoral coordination is presently seen in Baluchistan.
Supported by recent advocacy and technical support by UNICEF and the World Bank, there has
been recognition of a wider contract of nutrition across stakeholders and interest for cross-sectoral
stakeholder partnerships. Sindh has better technical resources and a well-resourced private sector
for nutrition planning; however, there is lack of cohesion between departments, uneven interest,
and slow movement. In Punjab, there has been speedy movement towards setting up of an InterSectoral Nutrition Committee, but nutrition tends to be narrowly interpreted as a health subject
requiring multi-sectoral links rather than a cross-sectoral agenda. In KPK, cross-sectoral planning
has been initiated, but is slower, more deliberative, and carefully coordinated with provincial
development priorities in the post-devolution scenario.
3.4.3 Coordination between State and Non-State
Coalitions between the state and non-state sectors are weak in all provinces, with lack of a work
culture and platforms for consultative dialogue and strategic coordination. This is compounded
by a historically distanced relationship between the bureaucracy and non-state sector. Infrequent
instances of coordination between the two sectors have usually been mediated by development
partners. Governments in KPK and Punjab are taking decisive steps towards Public-Private
Partnerships and regulation of the non-state sector towards key sectoral goals, at least in health
and food. Sindh has the most vibrant non-state sector, including experts, private providers, NGOs,
and media; however, instances of collaboration are usually informal and individual-led, rather
than sustained and owned by the sectors. In Baluchistan, there is little movement on coordination
forums between the state and non-state sectors due to lack of capacity.
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3.5 Funding
There are strong commonalities across provinces in terms of nutrition funding, with differences
emerging only recently in the post-devolution context.
Historic commonalities: Nutrition initiatives in all provinces, as mentioned earlier, had been
dependent on small-scale development partner funding; initiatives were piecemeal, often
overlapping, and lacked coordination amongst donors. Provincial budgetary support has been
extremely inadequate, supporting only a focal person for nutrition in health and not in other
sectors. Commodity support extended only to folic acid and iron supplements to pregnant and
lactating women by the LHW programme funded by federal budgetary support, whilst fortification
and Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) was dependent on occasional
commodity supply from donors. Matching government allocations for donor-funded projects
were confined to PC-1 on development budgets and did not get integrated into operational sectoral
budgets.
New opportunities but low capture for nutrition: The 2009 NFC award has increased resourceshare to all provinces, with greater share to the less-developed provinces of Baluchistan and
KPK. Overall, it represents an additional budget of 20.4 per cent for Punjab, 24.5 per cent for
Sindh, 58 per cent for KPK, and 132 per cent for Baluchistan (see Table 8).
Table 8: 2010 National Finance Commission (NFC) Awards and 2006 Distribution of
Revenues and Grants-in-Aid Order (DRGO) amounts distributed to each province

Source: SPDC, 2011.

Health, the main sector in which nutrition has been operationalised, has so far not taken
advantage of increased fiscal space as a result of the 7th NFC award, and continues to
receive a low proportionate share of overall provincial expenditure. Better allocation and
steady increase is confined to Punjab, whilst the smaller provinces show lower allocations
and lack of increase (see Table 9). The smallest allocation is in Baluchistan, despite
having the highest level of health and social-sector deprivation. The majority of operational
expenditure in all four provinces is spent on staff salaries, which have increased in all
four provinces and alarmingly in KPK (+75 per cent), Sindh (+70 per cent) and Baluchistan
(+63 per cent). The majority of development expenditure is spent on infrastructure
schemes, and has increased dramatically in Baluchistan (+167 per cent), instigated by
pressure from political representatives. Hospital construction, upgrading, and running
dominate health expenditure in all provinces, comprising more than two-thirds of
consolidated development and operational funding.
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Recent Changes During 2012: Recent profiling of nutrition has been accompanied by positive
changes in donor funding in all four provinces, and state funding in at least two provinces of
KPK and Punjab. In the wake of the SUN movement and local focusing events in Pakistan, donor
funding has been up-scaled, there is coordinated contribution by different donors, and a shift
taken towards medium-term, five-year funding from prior short-term projects. The funding is
being used to support implementation of an expanded range of cost-effective nutrition interventions
with wider coverage. Substantive funds will flow to the provincial government, rather than being
directly managed by international agencies as done in the past. There have also been changes
in terms of funding processes, with faster and more efficient donor-government engagement
processes experienced as a result of direct engagement of donors with provinces in the postdevolution scenario. Whilst this has paved the way for substantial inflow of funds, it has also
created complexities for strategising of donor investment by the EAD at federal level. However,
there are also downsides to enhanced funding. First, the funding is limited to the health sector
and likely to further increase traction of health rather than widening the nutrition agenda. Second,
there are provincial discrepancies in terms of donor funding with concentration of both nutritionand health-related funding in the Northern Pakistan provinces of KPK and Punjab supported
through grants in KPK and a mix of grants and loans in Punjab. In the Southern provinces of
Sindh and Baluchistan, only nutrition support is being negotiated (through loans). Third, much
of the funding is tied up with expensive commodity costs, and it is uncertain how these will be
sustained after withdrawal of donor support.
State funding for nutrition is a smaller share across all provinces and confined to the 20 per cent
matching amount for donor pledge to health. However, amongst provinces, there are important
differences in terms of sustainability of the government-pledged amount. In KPK and Punjab,
their integrated PC-1 are being developed to link nutrition with maternal, neonatal, and child
health (MNCH) programmes, hence increasing the chances of sustainability through shared
resources. In Sindh and Baluchistan, standalone nutrition programmes are being established,
increasing their fragility after the withdrawal of donor support. Table 10 provides a list of costeffective nutrition interventions currently under planning in the provinces.
Table 10: Nutrition interventions under planning in the provinces
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3.6 Vertical Coordination
3.6.1 Provincial Commonalities
A subset of nutrition activities has been largely uniform across the provinces, as it was shaped
and funded by UN agencies and GAIN support with some support from the federal LHW
programme. Nutrition activities have included preventive health strategies, salt iodisation, wheat
fortification pilot, and school feeding. In all four provinces, nutrition has been a low-priority
agenda led by the donors and some federal support, and it has lacked cohesive planning as well
as staff capacity for implementation. Preventive health interventions have included Vitamin-A
supplementation to children, piggybacked on polio, iron, and folate provision to mothers through
the LHW programme, de-worming and routine counselling on infant and young child feeding
at health facilities, and through LHWs (see Table 11). Other activities, such as CMAM, breastfeeding
campaigns, and community advocacy, have had patchy coverage confined to specific projects.
Table 11: Mother & child care: Micronutrient supplementation, feeding practises,
undernutrition management

Source: NNS,¹ Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).²
Vitamin-A Supplementation Survey, Aga Khan University and Micronutrient Initiative³

Vitamin-A supplementation has achieved better results across all provinces compared to other
health activities, due largely to effective horizontal coordination with the federally run polio
immunisation programme. However, gaps between reported and actual immunisation levels raise
questions on actual Vitamin-A coverage, and actual figures may be much lower. Fortification
and school feeding involved separate coordination of donors directly with provincial governments,
and there are variations in terms of extent of success. Salt iodisation in Pakistan is a relatively
successful intervention as seen by iodised salt rates of more than 50 per cent in at least three
provinces; however, it has had varying success rates in the provinces. Wheat fortification has
been confined to a pilot in KPK, and has yet to be extended to other provinces. In all provinces,
there has been low interest of the state in fortification and unwillingness to support operational
commodity costs despite relatively cheap commodities, particularly for salt. This has led to supply
breaks in fortification commodity because of tapering off of international agency funding and
disruption of fortification activities. School-feeding pilots in all provinces have been donorinstigated, and state focus has primarily been more on increasing enrolment through food
commodity distribution with less emphasis on nutrition.
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3.6.2 Provincial Differences
There are, however, important variations in terms of implementation related to local contextual
resources, governance, and funding (see Table 12).
Baluchistan faces the toughest community outreach issues due to low population density and has
correspondingly low levels of preventive interventions such as hand-washing with soap, exclusive
breastfeeding, contraceptive use, Vitamin-A supplementation, and de-worming. However, district
backwardness has not been factored in for operational budgets with salary-dominated budgets,
leaving insufficient space for field outreach and supervision. There is also little cooperation
between districts and the province and pervasive political appointments in the bureaucracy. This
has further weakened implementation. Baluchistan also has inadequate private food processors,
especially in the more remote districts, decreasing the success of fortification in these districts.
KPK, despite also having outreach issues in certain remote and conflict-affected districts had
performed better than the other provinces in terms of coverage rates of several of the ongoing
interventions such as salt iodisation, de-worming, hand-washing, and exclusive breastfeeding.
Success is linked to strong district ownership and local accountability rather than a strong
provincial role, and results thereby vary across districts. Some support has also been provided
by community awareness facilitated by NGOs, and district legislations, as in the case of salt
iodisation, but it has played a lesser role. School-feeding interventions have not been continued
beyond donor-supported pilots, with planning for more nutrition-valued interventions (such as
nutrition education in schools) under consideration in the province.
In Sindh, nutrition-intervention coverage levels are elevated due to the high concentration of
urban population, whilst coverage levels in rural Sindh fall alarmingly and are close to or worse
than Baluchistan. Even with overall provincial estimates, Sindh is behind other provinces in
terms of availability of iodised salt, de-worming, hand-washing with soap, and exclusive
breastfeeding. Outreach is easier than in Baluchistan and KPK, and confined to a few districts,
but little cooperation between the province and districts and political appointments hamper
effective delivery. A case in point is salt fortification, which, despite the presence of supportive
district legislations in Sindh, has had low coverage. Sindh is one of the two provinces that has
expanded school feeding beyond donor-supported pilots to cover girls’ schools in five disadvantaged
districts. Although it has ownership of the education department, its focus on food ration distribution
design issues and technical capacity dilutes the nutritional value.
Punjab has the highest rates of salt iodisation and vitamin-A supplementation, and is the secondbest-performing province after KPK for other preventive interventions in place. Performance of
health interventions is largely due to a strong level of vertical command and control from province
to district. A strong administrative culture has also been responsible for the highest salt iodisation
rate, despite being the only province lacking enforcing legislation. It has also been helpful in
minimising food supply breaks in school feeding. Punjab, like Sindh, has expanded school feeding
with ownership and funding from the education department; however, Punjab faces similar design
issues for nutrition as underlying interests, and vertical accountability is on school enrolment.
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Table 12: Vertical coordination of nutrition in the provinces

Source: OPM LHW Report 2009.¹

3.7 Monitoring
All four provinces have a credible database of nutrition indicators, provided by two rounds of
the NNS conducted in 2011 and 2001, to serve as baseline for planned interventions. It also has
a reasonably expansive database for potential targeting of poor beneficiaries provided by the
BISP in at least three provinces, with coverage issues in Baluchistan, where considerable numbers
of disadvantaged females do not have national identity cards. The gap commonly lies in all
provinces in absence of an interim system for monitoring progress. Content of monitoring also
needs attention, as so far the emphasis has been on anthropometric measures whilst a common
basket of nutrition indicators across health, food, agriculture, education, PHE, NDMA, etc., is
missing to monitor progress.
There has been donor-supported movement in health to roll out a Nutrition Information System
across the village and facility levels. Monitoring of food-fortification parameters has unclear
reporting lines between health and food, with Punjab the only province to amalgamate these into
a newly set-up Food Regulatory Authority. Food security has benefitted with development of a
Food Security Index at the national level, but is yet to be operationalised at the provincial level.
Education has started with school-feeding projects in Sindh and Punjab; however, nutrition
monitoring is poorly defined and lacks technical support. Other sectors are still in the process
of defining their nutrition mandate and indicators.
There is also lack of a central structure in all provinces to house the Nutrition Survey database
and serve as a hub for periodic reporting of nutrition. Reliance on health, as currently done, to
provide interim progress through its information database, is likely to undermine cross-sectoral
placement of nutrition.
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Opportunities and Way Ahead
Reducing undernutrition requires dealing with the underlying issues that contribute to the problem,
technical changes in ongoing interventions, and sensitising a host of relevant line ministries to
focus more on nutrition as a central part of their work. The separate provincial reports make
detailed recommendations for this. The recommendations provided below focus in particular on
the political economy challenges of getting nutrition on the national and provincial development
agenda, on building a momentum around this, and on improving delivery systems in order to be
able to implement policies and strategies. A constituency for nutrition is missing in Pakistan, and
the recommendations below present a menu of various reforms that can help build such a
constituency.
Much of the success of these reforms will depend on two socio-political systemic requirements
for the reduction of undernutrition. First, women have to be empowered. This requires better
education of women, reduced discrimination against women in access to food and healthcare,
and, most importantly, enabling them to play a greater role in household-level decision-making,
especially in terms of their own health and well-being. Second, Pakistan has to transition towards
the consolidation of democracy. This, together with a waning role of the military in politics, may
bring political parties to strengthen their programmatic linkages with their electorate, and to focus
more closely on their demands and needs. Democratic consolidation, regular elections, and a
strengthening of the internal organisational mechanisms of political parties can strengthen this
process and move it away from a clientelistic focus towards more programmatic linkages between
political parties and their voters. This is important both for the stability of policy processes and
for the creation of societal demand for better social service delivery, including on nutrition.

4.2 Lessons from the Experience of Other Countries
In looking at recommendations, a central question arises: How did change come about in other
countries where nutrition policy was also under-prioritised and responses to undernutrition equally
fragmented? Comparisons with India have already been made in the report. In this section, we
present the experience with nutrition policy in a few other countries. Whilst the general disclaimers
apply regarding the limits to generalising other experiences and the uniqueness of historicalsocial processes, the comparative experience suggests some useful entry points for action.


Executive leadership and involvement in hosting and coordinating government efforts
around nutrition across different sectors have been critical. In some cases, strong executive
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition has emerged from long historical
traditions (as in Brazil or Niger), but in others, commitment has emerged in an opportunistic
fashion, in the context of an electoral campaign (as in Peru or Zambia). In Brazil, the
commitment to reduce undernutrition translated into the creation of the Ministry of Social
Development (MDS) and Fight Against Hunger in 2004. The new ministry enjoyed
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direct communication and policy support with Casa Civil, the Executive’s office. To
materialise and monitor government efforts, a consultative board composed of 38 civil
society representatives and 19 government ministries was formed in that year to provide
support, monitoring, and policy guidance to the President in the formulation of food and
nutrition security policy and programmes.


The defining factor in securing sustainable commitment over time, however, has been
the active role that CSOs and NGOs have played in holding governments accountable
and monitoring the effective implementation of such commitment, as was the case in
Brazil (with the Fome Zero campaign in the ‘90s) and in Peru (with the Children’s
Nutrition Initiative in the mid-2000s).



Developing a single discourse around nutrition has been key. In countries like Brazil or
Peru, the fight against hunger and food security triggered civil society mobilisation and
significant government attention during the ‘80s and ‘90s. Policy attention and government
interventions, however, shifted towards nutrition interventions when food distribution
campaigns proved to be insufficient or too expensive to secure effective nutrition gains.
In Peru, the shift was facilitated by information produced by different think tanks and
a change in policy priorities from bilateral funding agencies (USAID).



Effective vertical coordination is key to ensure adequate nutrition governance. Vertical
coordination can be built from pre-existing government or bureaucratic structures that
are not necessarily nutrition-related. In Ethiopia, the government party, Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has a solid political structure that is replicated
down to community (kebele) level. Although the country has lacked a consistent and
specific nutrition mandate, key stakeholders identified a significant potential for nutrition
coordination through existing committee structures in which staff from different
government sectors are represented at the woreda (municipal) and kebele levels.



Ensuring effective and transparent nutrition funding mechanisms are as important as
securing the sufficient flows of nutrition investments. The comparative experience
suggests that funding is intrinsically connected to effective sectoral and territorial
coordination. Cooperation across government sectors can be expected if ministries have
access to and benefit from a common funding source, ideally one that is budgeted over
several years. Countries can adopt different allocation and reporting modalities to ensure
effective funding, including results-based budgeting (Peru), conditional cash transfers
(Brazil) or emergency pooled funding mechanisms (Niger). In a similar way, effective
vertical coordination can materialise when funding flows along programmatic lines from
the national (federal) to the regional and local levels.



Proactive private-sector involvement is another feature that emerges as a success factor
in other countries. The private sector can be involved in policy consultation and monitoring
(along with government or NGO groups in Peru), in mobilising and securing larger
funding flows (as in Zambia or Ethiopia), or contributing directly or indirectly (through
media or funding efforts) to raise civil awareness and secure government commitment
(as in Peru or Brazil).
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4.3 Interventions in Pakistan
To move towards a common development vision around nutrition, a number of simultaneous
steps are required towards nutrition policy, funding, central convening structures, joint initiatives,
maximising technical opportunities, and, above all, political support. Based on the federal and
provincial analysis, and lessons learnt from other countries, we make a number of recommendations
as discussed below.
Political Support: Championing at the highest executive level is required to leverage nutrition
across development priorities as a bipartisan agenda across party lines. Nutrition needs to be
well-advocated to politicians, particularly taking advantage of existing cross-sectoral forums
such as women’s caucus in parliament.
Nutrition Policy: A cross-cutting nutrition policy is needed to enforce sectoral priorities leading
to adopting of a nutrition lens and nutrition indicators for planning across key sectors. In the
post-devolution scenario, a bottom-up process can be envisaged, whereby provincial national
policies are formed and pave the way for a commonly endorsed national nutrition policy involving
communication and concurrence across the two levels. To date, nutrition interventions have been
dealt with through a project approach by both the state and donors. As a government official put
it, “In Pakistan we have a project approach and not a policy approach. We are a graveyard of
failed projects”. In the absence of a national policy, work on nutrition is dependent to a large
extent on the initiatives of individuals, separate projects, and specific champions within political
and bureaucratic structures. In a variable, fragmented polity like Pakistan, it is all the more
important to have a social policy that has strong bureaucratic ownership, is based on technocratic
expertise and on evidence, and is outcome-oriented, so that successive regimes have no choice
but to own it. Nutrition needs to be integrated into the regular functions of ministries through a
nutrition policy under which government staff are mandated and notified to deliver, and donors
can integrate their work with the defined government strategy.
Inter-sectoral Structures: Multi-sectoral coordination needs coordinating bodies, a forum that
not only allows a space on which the different sectors can sit together, but also one that has the
authority to push them towards the necessary compromises and accommodations that are required
to balance the differing agendas of the various actors (e.g. Annex 2). A central convening structure
is required to house nutrition and would be ideally supported by nutrition focal units in each of
the key relevant sectors. In the provinces, the respective provincial P&DDs are a possible entity
for the housing of nutrition with the mandate to coordinate planning, ensure adequacy of funds,
manage joint fund flows, and to monitor. A coordination body is also required at the federal level
and with the authority to convene a broad array of actors from both the federal and provincial
governments. Incentives will be needed to make central convening structures effective and can
include central housing of monitoring database, joint funding lines, approval of sectoral plans,
undertaking of joint sectoral initiatives, and provision of technical capacity.
Strengthening Districts: District and local governments need to be strengthened and recognised
as a distinct set of stakeholders so that those who implement programmes actually have ownership
over them.


District Nutrition Implementation Units: The provincial nutrition coordination structures
need to be complemented by District Nutrition Implementation Units that are also multi
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sectoral and bring together the various sectoral EDOs at the district level, under the
DCO, to coordinate implementation of nutrition interventions within the different sectors.
This coordination would include the officials of the tehsil government, and, post-local
government elections, also representatives of the union councils.


Capacity-Building: Staff capacity for working technically on nutrition, including how
to plan, cost, and coordinate interventions, also needs to be improved. Furthermore,
frontline staff should be trained in the collection of data for monitoring nutrition and the
progress and impact of interventions. Most importantly, the network of frontline staff
that has actual contact with households in villages and neighbourhoods needs to be
expanded within the various nutrition-related line ministries. For the staff that already
exists at the frontline, an integrated work plan and result framework should be created
to bring together the school, PHE, BHU, and the LHW.

Sustained and Pooled Funding: Nutrition continues to be funded through piecemeal PC-1
projects on the development budget rather than sustained and owned on the recurrent budget.
As one respondent from a donor agency put it, “we have to start thinking about taking our
programmes to scale. We cannot keep doing projects and hope to make a difference”. The
interactions between development partners and the government in fora like the D-10 need to
move beyond projects and PC-1s in the direction of budgetary support to operational budgets
and sectors that can be incentivised through result-based funding support by donors.
There are at least four key areas where coordinated funding could be strengthened: policy
coherence, government and donor coordination, coordinated devolution, and improved monitoring.


Linking funds to a strategic plan (policy coherence): A key starting point is to ensure
that nutrition funding is aligned with and directly responds to spending priorities outlined
by a national nutrition policy, and/or a broader poverty reduction plan. This effort would
entail producing a detailed costing of priority nutrition interventions, and the costing
should ideally be linked to the attainment of key nutrition targets. The purpose of
creating a dedicated budget line is to move away from project-based approaches and
embed in the budget cycle the financial and political commitment to longer-term nutrition
funding.



Government and donor coordination mechanisms for pooling funds: Linking nutrition
investment to provincial strategic plans can build a binding commitment from donors
and the government to pool and coordinate spending allocations. This would require that
the EAD work closely with the proposed national and provincial convening structures
to allocate funds for nutrition initiatives across different sectors. It is also necessary to
build a “matching funds” component to ensure that the government gradually increases
its relative contribution to nutrition funding over a course of several years.



Coordination for spending nutrition funds at provincial level: The main challenge
regarding spending at the sub-national level is to coordinate different initiatives to avoid
duplication, ensure effective use of funds, and guarantee transparency of allocations.
There is popular support within sectors for independent but close-working budgetary
lines that can be constructively tapped for joint initiatives that have well-defined
interventions, common beneficiaries and geographical targets, and soft conditionalities.
Joint funding lines can more efficiently coordinate — one clear example of provincial
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level coordination is the possibility of allocating funds through conditional cash transfers
with an added nutrition-specific component.


Tracking and monitoring progress: The last challenge is to provide a results-based,
budget-monitoring mechanism to ensure that allocated nutrition funding is clearly
identified and monitored by donors, government officials, and civil society watchdogs.
In Pakistan, the Finance Ministry, EAD, and the provincial P&DDs are ideally placed
to develop an effective tracking and monitoring mechanism to assess changes and
distribution of nutrition-funding allocations, possibly with donor support for the initial
development of the system.

Affordable Funding: Affordable funding options need to be explored and require development
of local, low-cost home rehabilitation diets/foods, and appropriate nutrition rehabilitation services
for severe acute malnutrition. It also requires building in economies of scale through maximising
utilisation of all contact points such as immunisation services, school services, and targeting
opportunities such as those provided by BISP.
Effective Administration: The Pakistani state’s system of managing the implementation of
social-sector services requires considerable administrative reform to make the bureaucracy more
results-oriented. To incentivise staff, performance-based measures need to be introduced, such
as shifting towards objective, tangible, performance-oriented ACRs instead of “subjective
evaluations of officers’ character” (ICG 2010). Furthermore, “standard operating procedures for
most ministries have not been revised for years, leading to…confusion among staff about their
powers, functions and responsibilities” (ICG 2010). Performance-based evaluations should include
incentives for multi-sectoral activities for the staff of particular ministries, such as joint responsibility
for outcomes and future funds connected to joint results.
Integrated Nutrition Information System: Existing focus needs to expand from anthropometric
measurements collected after decade-long intervals through the NNS to interim monitoring of
progress with a common basket of pro-nutrition indicators across health, food, PHE, education,
WASH, poverty, and disaster, and linked to a joint M&E framework. The development of an
integrated Nutrition Information System can bring together indicators collected from all the
relevant sectors — education, health, sanitation, agriculture, and food — within the same database
on a regular basis. Housing of this system within the central convening body will provide a
gravitating pull towards inert-sectoral coordination.
Coalition with the Non-state Sector: Enhancement of the non-state sector, involving service
providers, experts, media, NGOs, and local change agents, is required for nutrition services, data
production, awareness, and social accountability. Investment also needs to be made in building
up forums for state-non-state partnerships at policy, service delivery, research, and communication
levels. There are three distinct sets of non-state stakeholders with whom partnerships can be
made:


The private sector stands to make a major contribution to the reduction of undernutrition
if its incentives can be aligned with those of other nutrition stakeholders. It can
help provide additional investment for nutrition initiatives, can help promote
government goals, and can monitor some activities as part of a results-based
budgeting programme.
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In order to develop a single discourse around nutrition and build momentum around this,
donor groups and researchers need to create and maintain a research consortium that
would help create a narrative that connects nutrition to development beyond food
distribution and health interventions, and would work closely with the nutrition
convening bodies at the national and provincial levels to define an action plan
connected to a clearly identified goal. Much more research is required to provide
the state with the tangible, provocative numbers that may compel politicians into action,
and that will facilitate the formulation of national policy and targets.



Investment can be made in a media campaign and connecting this to the research
consortium to help develop evidence-based programming for electronic media. This
could help in changing popular perceptions on nutrition, with behavioural change in
terms of hygiene, disease prevention, and feeding practises, and in lobbying politicians
to maintain a strong political commitment to reducing children’s undernutrition.

4.4 Conclusion
Pakistan is currently in the process of a political and administrative transition, one that is still
fragile and a while away from consolidation. Along with yet another democratic transition has
come the extensive restructuring of the state and of the relationship between the centre and
provinces. Political and administrative elites are negotiating new terrain, establishing new linkages,
and slowly finding their way out of a constant state of crisis. Political parties, long marginalised
and manipulated, are in the process of moving beyond the requisite politics of survival to
establishing their legacies in terms of social development over the longer term. All in all, the fact
that it is a country in transition is a significant current constraint on getting an issue like nutrition
on the national agenda. However, this is also a time of new opportunities for actors like donor
agencies to help build momentum for nutrition within a transitional environment, and provide
support that can strengthen policy and administrative processes and translate into democratic
consolidation.
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ANNEX 1: Interviews Conducted – Islamabad October 2012
Government
Planning Commission
Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Finance
Ministry for Inter-Provincial Coordination
Ministry of National Food Security and Research
National Disaster Management Authority
Benazir Income Support Programme
Donor Agencies
World Bank
UNICEF
USAID
WHO
WFP
FAO
DFID
EU
CIDA
AusAid
Civil Society and Other International Organisations
Micronutrient Initiative
Save the Children
Media
Express News Anchor
Zara Sochiye Campaign
Research
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)
Lahore University of Management Science (LUMS)
Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS)
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Annex 2: Nutrition Planning and Implementation Framework – An
Hour-glass Model
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